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ABSTRACT

In 1966 Kentucky enacted a water use regulation statute which
makes :important modifications in the common law doctrine of riparian
rights by authorizing the state to grant permits for the use of water.
'Ihe permit system is primarily designed to allow the state to gather
the information necessary to conduct long range planning studies.
However, the permit system can also be used to appcrtion water arrong
competing users.

'Ihe repcrt examined the comm::,n law of riparian rights

to determine how KRS Ch. 151 had modified it and analyzed some of the
legal prcblems which could arise in the administration of the statute.
'Ihe standards for granting or denying a permit were examined in light

[

'

of the purpcse of Chapter 151.

Impcrtant common law modifications

such as the abolition of the watershed limitation were considered.
'Ihe procedural rights of applicants and third parties effected by the

[-

issuance of a permit were criticized because they do not prcvide an
adequate hearing and notice prccedure.

l
l
I
L
L

L
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'Ihe constitutional questions

raised by the failure of the Chapter expressly to prctect prior vested
rights were considered,

'Ihe repcrt concludes with an examination of

some emerging prcblems caused by the increased use of the state's
water for recreation.

FCST Category VI-E
Key Words - Legislation'', Legal aspects* , Fermits, Water law*,
Riparian rights, Planning

r
r
r

r
r
r

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter
I.
II.

Page

INTRODUCTION

1

'IHE COMMON lAW OF RIPARIAN RIGHTS

7

7

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION • • •

History of Riparian Doctrine in Kentucky.

I:

DEFINITION OF A WA'IER COURSE • • • • •
DEFINITION OF RIPARIAN lAND • • • • •
RIGHTS TO GROUND WA'IER • • • • . • •
ACQUISITION OF RIGHTS BY PRESCRIPTION

r

8

15
23
24
34

III.

PURPOSE OF OlAPI'ER 151 • • • • • • • •

36

IV.

STRUCTURE OF WA'IER RESOURCES PLANNING.

42

V.

FUNCTION OF PERMIT SYSTEM. •

47

VI.

OPERATION OF PERMIT SYSTEM •

52

re

I
I
I
I
[

EXEMPI'IONS. • • • • • •
APPLICATION PROCEDURE •
POWER OF DIVISION OF WATER TO ALI.OCA'IE DURING
PERIODS OF SHORI'AGE
TRANSBASIN DIVERSIONS • •
VII.
VIII.

IX.
X.

L
L
L

L

XI.

52
58

59
64

REGUIATION OF DAM CONSTRUCTION

67

PROCEIXJRAL RIGHTS OF APPLICANTS AND THIRD PARTIES

71

RIGHT TO HEARING • • • • • •
RIGHT TO APPEAL • • • • • •

71

CONSTIWITONALI'IY OF CEAPI'ER 151

83

SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF RECREATION WI'IH EMPHASIS ON
'IHE NAVIGATION SERVITUDE.

94

CONCLUSION .

8

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

75

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

106

[

.

Chapter I

r
[
[

INTRODUCTION
In 1966 Kentucky joined the growing list of F.astern states to partially
abandon the riparian system and enact a comprehensive statute regulating
water use.

It has been characterized by a political scientist as having

"strong regulatory pcwers diluted by broad exemptions 111--thus it is a typical
example of Kentucky's legislative style.

Nonetheless it is an important first

step for it provides same of the legal structure necessary for the future
management of the state' s water resources.

[

The purpose of this monograph is

to describe systematically and evaluate Kentucky laws and judicial decisions
relating to the diversion, transfer, and storage of water in light of the
state's present and future needs.
Kentucky is a water-rich state.

I
I

It has a statewide average rainfall

of 45 inches which "is reasonably well distributed over the state."

2

Thus,

the state has adequate streamflows and ground water supplies to meet its
present and future needs if they are managed properly.

Shortage problems do,

however, exist.

In 1930 and again in 1953 many areas of the state experienced
3
severe short-run droughts and many areas today face this possibility because

I

of inadequate carry-over storage facilities.
Kentucky's water needs are diverse and growing.

Population patterns

L

L

L

4ieath, Water Management Legislation in the F.astern United States, 2
Land and Water law Review 99, 101 (1967).
2Department of Natural Resources, Kentucky Water Resources:
8 (1965).

1965

3
see, Legislative Research Commission, Water Rights law in Kentucky
Report No. 32 2-5 (1956).

and the projected regional role of the state will determine future demands.
Prior to the mid-1960's Kentucky's population was virtually static because
4
a high out-migration cancelled rrost of the natural increases.
This outmigration has been substantially reduced because of a successful state
industrial recruitment campaign.

Substantial intra-state migration is taking

place and the population is increasingly being concentrated in the state's
urban areas such as Louisville, Paducah, Greater Cincinnati, Lexington, Bowling
Green, CMensboro and Ashland.

Kentucky is expected to have some three and

three quarters million people by 1980, but will still be one of the less
populous states in the southeast and midwest.

This means that it will

increasingly serve as an agricultural and recreation reserve for the more
populous urbanized states to the north and west.
These briefly are the kinds of water demands the state will face in
the future:

(1)

Agriculture--Most farmers still rely on natural rainfall

and small storage ponds but the use of irrigation is increasing, especially
for tobacco.

It is estimated that some 103. 7 billion gallons per year will
5
be required by 1980.
(2) Industry--New industry, especially the chemicals,
paper, and metals require large quantities of water.

However, most uses are

non-consumptive and the major problems are not quantity but the quality of
6
the discharges into streams and ground water basins.
(3) Municipal-The state's growing areas will require additional supplies but no long range
shortages are forecast. 7 (4) Recreation and Fish and Wild Life--These uses
are non-consumptive but large quantities of water are required to support
them.

Mechanisms must be created to insure minimum flows and lake levels.

4repartment of Natural Resources, Kentucky Water Resources: 1965
21-24 (1965).
5rd.

at 21-23.

6rd.

at 24-26.

7rd.

at 26-27.
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With its 531 square miles of JIDuntain streams, rivers, lakes and reservoirs
Kentucky's recreation potential is unlimited because of its proximity to
the urban midwest and east if adequate supplies are reserved for these uses.
(5)

8

Pollution aba.tement--The use of streams to purify polluted discharges

will oontinue for the foreseeable future although federal and state regulatory programs are being implemented.
Kentucky may also serve as a source of supply for its m::ire populous
neighbors such as Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois.

r·

If water becomes scarce in

toose states, they may turn to Kentucky for additional supplies • Interstate
compacts similar to those along the Colorado River in the West may have to
.

be negotiated.

9

The I:epartment of Natural Resources estimated that by 1980 Kentucky will

L

oonsume 477,000,000 gallons per day in addition to the large quantities of
"'. h must be reserved ~or
,: non-consumptive
.
water .wuic
use. 10 This will still not

put a severe strain on the total am::iunt of available supply as it is estimated
that some 12 trillion gallons of water are available each year as a result
of natural rainfall after evaporation.

!

Kentucky's abundance of natural water supply does not mean that the
state will be without problems.

The failure of cities to provide adequate

storage facilities to augment their historic source of supply may cause

[

L
L

L
L

soort-run shortages.

It is often stated that resources should be managed to

8Id. at 27-29.
9For a discussion of the problems of allocating the supply of the

Colorado see, Meyers, The Colorado River 19 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1966) and
Meyers and Noble, The Colorado River: The Treaty with Mexico, 19 Stan.
L. Rev. 367 (1967).
10Id. at 18.
- 3 -

encourage their multiple use , but not all uses of water are compatible.
The use of a reservoir for flood control storage may conflict with its
use as a swmner playground if it is drawn down to provide water for downstream cities during the hot months or to provide room for winter and
spring run-offs. 11 Systems analysis using m:xlels now being developed by
the Division of Water may result in pressures to shift water from one location to another in order to maximize the benefits capable of being derived
from a limited supply and the state's legal institutions must be capable
of responding to new criteria for allocating water in order to facilitate
the most efficient use of the comm::mwealth's water resources.
The Division of Water is currently developing a nl.llllber of ccrnputer
m:xlels to study the best use of the Corrm::lnwealth' s water resources.

The

project is financed by Title III funds authorized by the Water Resources
Planning Act of 1965. 12

One possible location scheme is suggested by the

following excerpt from the Division's 1967 progress report:
Water is an almost universally used resource, and is relatively
scarce in many areas.

A serious attempt must be made to allocate

the available supply in the most efficient way possible.

This

implies the development of a quantitative method for measuring the
value of water used in alternate ways.

Other studies have utilized

11see Hopkins, Impacts of Recreation on ~etition for Use of
Water, Western Resources Papers - Water, Development, Utilization,
Conservation 151, 155 (1963).
12Division of W3.ter, Department of Natural Resources, Water
Resources Planning in Kentucky (1967). The Water Resources Planning
Act of 1965 is outlined in Hart, Creative Federalism; Recent Trends in
Water Resources Planing, 39 Colo. L. Rev. 31 (1966).
- 4 -

the concept "value added per unit of water used"* to classify
industry types in accordance with their contribution relative to
their water use, and that seems to offer a fruitful possibility
here.

r

It will not, in and of itself, answer all questions with

respect to the best utilization of the water resource, but it
provides a quantitative measure which may be combined with
qualitative aspects of the problem in arriving at allocation
and planning decisions.

Once these values have been determined,

it is possible to combine them with information relative to the
geographical dispersion of industry within the state and thus

:

[

L
[~

to estimate the regional consequences of shifts in final demand
for products produced anywhere within the state.
of the concept for planning is obvious.

The importance

In areas of actual or

potential water shortage the push for increased industrialization.
should be in the direction of those industries where the ratio
is high--i.e., where value added per unit of water use is great.

I

In areas where there is an actual or potential water shortage and

where there is an established industry showing high value added
per unit of water used, then rich rewards await increased availability
of water resources.
However, it should be noted that value added per unit of water
used is not the same thing as the =ginal revenue productivity

L
L

L
L

of water in the industry's technology.

Value added per unit of

*Value added is used here in the technical sense. That is, for
a given industry, value added is equal to the total market value
of its output less the value of intermediate goods it uses as
inputs.
- 5 -

water in the industry will be large whenever the numerator of the
13
ratio is large in oomparison with the denominator.

13 Id. at 41-42.
- 6 -
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Chapter II
THE COMMON I.AW OF RIPARIAN RIGHTS
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION
Kentucky does not have a well-developed corrm:m. law of water rights
reflecting the absence of substantial use conflicts during m::ist if its
history.

The state's early water problems were centered around the elim-

ination of health hazards caused by swamps and the improvement of navigation on the Ohio River and its tributaries rather than conflicts am:ing
conswrrptive users.

For example, lDuisville was known as the graveyard

of the west and a mecca for doctors after it was plagued by a series of
.
.
.
.
l4 A public
. drainage
.
epidemics
caused by its
swamps along t h e Oh"io River.

program was started in 1811 and the hazard was eventually eliminated.

I
I
I

A canal company was formed in 1835 to dig a canal around the Falls of the
15
Ohio which impeded navigation on the river.
The important conflicts
of the recent past have been ones of pollution, principally between coal
miners and downstream riparians, and surface drainage.

will not be covered in this report except as they relate to the allocation
and distribution of water.

I
I.
L
L
L

These problems

These examples serve only to illustrate the

focus on the state's natural resource problems which predominated during
its early history and to serve as a contrast to the kinds of problems the
state lll3.Y face in the future.
The COIIIllOn law of riparian rights is stiil.l important,. however,

1 4t.Jade, The Urban Frontier 87 (1959).
15Id. at 137.
- 7 -

because several elements of it have been incorporated into K.R.S. Ch, 151.
The canm:m law distinction between water flowing or standing in a natural
water course and diffused surface water is the basis of the Division of
Water's regulatory jurisdiction.

K.R.S. 151.210 preserves the domestic
16
preference for riparians as well as other rights.
Thus, an understanding

of K.R.S. Ch, 151 must start with a brief discussion of the Kentucky comoc,n
law of riparian rights.

I

History of Riparian D:lctrine in Kentucky
Kentucky has followed the doctrine of riparian rights rather than
the western doctrine of prior appropriation.

Riparian rights attach to

those who own land adjacent to a natural stream or watercourse, as one
1117
commentator explained it, "simply by virtue of his ownership of land.
The riparian right was conceptualized as an incident to the adjoining
property, thus the rights passed with a grant of riparian land regardless
of whether they were specifically conveyed. 18

Further, the right was

neither lost by nonuse nor were any acts of intention to use or actual
use required to perfect a riparian right.

The right could be asserted

whenever the downstream riparian decided that he was threatened by the
use being rrade of the water by the upstream riparian.
The doctrine of riparian rights has historically been considered
a branch of the law of real property.

This has led to a rigid view of the

right and forms that basis for the frequently asserted claim that any
public interference with the right would be a taking of private property

16K.R.S. 151.120(1) (1966).
17

The Comronwealth of Massachusetts, Legislative Research Council
Report: Rights to Surface and Subsurface Waters in Massachusetts 18 (1957).
18clark, ed. Waters and Water Rights 53.4 (1967).
- 8 -

f
I

for which compensation must be paid.

r

However, the position that the laws

governing the use of land should govern the use of water are untenable
in light of the history of the common law as it developed in England and
the United States.
The English common law developed during an era when water use conflicts were not serious and there was little attempt to formulate a
functional theory of water rights.

The English courts frequently announced

that rule that "every man has a right to have the advantage of a flow of
water in his

= land without diminution or alteration," except as one

. h t acquire
.
. .
. h t. 19
mig
a prescriptive
rig
Thus, the first user on the stream

might gain all the water or a downstream riparian might be able to enjoin
all upstream use without showing any injury by the upstream use but this

[:

r-

doctrine was never applied to its logical conclusion but the important
fact for an understanding of American water law is that it was not accepted
by American scholars during the time when the American common law or
.
.
.
riparian
rights
was be'ing developed. 20

I
I

The two leading American scholars who developed the American corrunon
law are Justice Story and Chancellor Kent.

The test adopted by Justice

Story and promulgated by Kent in his Commentaries was derived both from
19

I
L
L
L
L

Bealey v. Shaw 6 Ea.st 208, 102 Eng. Rep. 1266 (1805). In the case
an upstream mill owner enlarged his sluice which reduced the flow available to the downstream CMner. The court held for the downstream mill
owner on the theory that he had been the first to use the water, although
he had not used it for the prescriptive period, and thus was entitled to
an injunction. The English court in effect applied the doctrine of prior
appropriation rather than the natural flow theory.
20
The history of the doctrine is admirably discussed in lauer, The
Co=n law Background of the Riparian D:lctrine, 28 Mo. L. Rev. 60 (1963),
and lauer, The Riparian Right as Property, Water Resources and the law
133 (1958).
- 9 -

the civil law.

21

The civil law, developing, from

Roman

law had never been

burdened with the tension between the absoluteness of private property
rights in land and the difficulty of applying these concepts to water.
The civil law, as reflected in the Code Napoleon of 18 04 , gave each
riparian on the stream a co-relative right to use the water.
were to be determined by the facts of the individual case.

Adjustments
The English

ccmoon law had been struggling toward this position but had never clearly
conceptualized the development.

Story recognized the potential economic

absurdity of the English cOIIlllOn law and turned instead to the French Law
and its Roman origin because of their emphasis on the correlative rights
of each user along the stream.
Kentucky's first case adopted Justice Story's reasonable use theory,
although latter cases fumbled around conceptually before returning to a
clear enunciation of it.

The leading Kentucky case on the law of riparian
22
rights is Anderson v. Cincinnati Southern Railway.
Plaintiff operated
a grist mill over a stream and defendant built a nine foot high dam upstream to store water for its trains which diminished the flow of the
stream causing the mill to stop.
riparian law:

(1)

The court stated the basic premises of

every proprietor of lands along the banks of streams

has an equal and usufructory right to the water while it passes his land,
(2)

the law distinguishes between domestic and artificial uses.

The land

owner may use all the water necessary to supply his domestic needs but
he is limited to a reasonable and proportionate share of the water necessary
for artificial uses.

The court found that supplying railroad trains was a

21
see Wiel, Waters:
Rev. 133 (1919).
22 86 Ky. 44 (1887).

American and French Authority, 33 Harv. L.

- 10 -

reasonable but artificial use of the water and stated that the relevant
inquiry was "whether its use for the purposes the railroad injured the

r
r

mill below."

The court held that plaintiff would be entitled to an

injunction if he proved injury.

Anderson is a straightforward and correct

application of the reasonable use standard but the opinion caused considerable
conceptual ccnfusion for subsequent courts because the court originally
dropped the phrase that "every proprietor . . • has naturally an equal
right to the use of the water which flows in the stream adjacent to his
. .
.
.
. .
.
23
lands, as it is wont to run without dimunition or alteration."
Although
this was immediately contradicted by the next sentence which said "No
proprietor has a right to use the water to the prejudice of other proprietor above or below him, unless he has a prior right to divert it, or
a title to some exclusive enjoyment. 1124 The natural flow theory was furthur rejected when the court emphasized that recovery could not be had
on a simple showing of upstream diversion but that there had to be a showing
of diversion plus injury.
In J<rawler v. Smith,

25

a 1915 decision, a distillery was polluting

a stream by discharging .slop.

A lower riparian sued and was granted an

injunction on the sanewhat garbled theory that the riparian is "entitled
to the natural flow of the water, unimpaired in quality, except as may be
occasioned by reasonable use of the stream by other proprietors" but the

l
L
L
L
L

court did emphasize the need to show substantial injury before an injunction
cculd be granted, so it is clear they were applying the reasonable use theory.

23

rd. at 48.

24rd. at 48-49.
25 154 Ky. 674, 177 S.W. 286 (1915).
- 11 -

In 1949 the court of appeals was still unsure of which theory it had

adopted.

In City of lDuisville v. Tway 26 defendant damed a creek which

impeded its flow and plaintiff lower-riparian alleged that this aggravated
the stream's pollution condition because the velocity was no longer sufficient to flush the stream.

The lower riparian naturally urged the natural

flow theory and the court surprisingly agreed saying, "it is true that, as
suggested by council, that our court is comnitted to the natural flow theory"
but then said it made little difference which theory applied as no injunction
oould issue unless a substantial showing of injury was made.

The court's

opinion about the consequences of the tv.D theories shows complete confusion
but the result indicates that the reasonable use theory was always the
law in Kentucky.
The confusion in the Kentucky cases was eliminated in 1954 when the
.
. .
27
legislature enacted a statute codifying the reasonable use rule.
K.R.S.
262.690(1) limited the riparian to the amount of water reasonably necessary
to meet his needs.

The danestic preference was retained but language

intended to limit ±ts application was included.

28

There have been few cases which have defined the concept of reasonable
29 Most of these have dealt with the right of the upper
use in Kentucky.

26 297 Ky. 565, 108 S.W. 2d 278 (1949).
27
Kentucky 1 s 1954 water law statutes were modeled after similar
enactments in Virginia. See Note, A Comparative Analysis of Kentucky
Water Law 43 Ky. L. J. 504 (1954).
28
K.R.S. 262.690 (1) limited water for domestic use to "household
purposes, drinking water for livestock, poultry, and domestic animals."
29 ror a discussion of the reasonable use doctrine see Murphy, A
Short Course on Water Law for the Eastern United States, 1961 U.L.Q.
93, 96-102, 109-10.
- 12 -
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riparian to discharge unwanted
of the lower riparia~.

30

or polluted

31

water to the detriment

'Ihese situations deal with activities by the upper

riparian which are not compatible with the lower riparian and if the lower
riparian is to be protected the upper riparian JlUlSt either be prohibited
from carrying on his activity or be compelled to pay damages to the lower
riparian.

'Ihe courts have devised no consistent set of criteria to deter-

mine if a given use is reasonable.

They have relied both on categories

of uses which are uniformly tmreasonable, such as pollution, and on the
proposition that no use can be classified as unreasonable except in the

r
L

I
[

I
L
[_

L
L

context of the use with which it conflicts.

There have been few Kentucky

30

See, e.g., Crabtree Coal Minip.g Co. v. Bamby's Adm'r, 28 Ky.
90 s.w. 226 (1906).
31
See, e.g., Inland Steel v. Isaacs, 283 Ky. 770, 143 S.W.2d
503 (1940).
3laCompare Crabtree Coal Mining Co. v. Bamby's Adm'r, 28 Ky. 687,
90 S.W. 226 (1906) with North-East Coal Co. v. Hayes, 224 Ky. 639, 51
S.W.2d 960 (1932). Both cases involved conflicts between the holder of
the surface estate and the holder of mineral rights who was alleged to
have damaged the surface estate by pollution. In Crabtree the court
held for the surface owner on the theory that the c~any had a right
to use the stream "in a reasonable degree but it may not materially
alter its quality. " The court' s reasoning mixes both the reasonable use
and~ se unreasonable theories of pollution but its tone indicates that
it considered substanti~ pollution unreasonable~ se. In North-East
Coal Co., the court applied a reasonable use analysis to the right of
the mineral owner to pollute the surface owner's water supply as part of
his mining operations , saying that the holder of the minerals would be
liable for pollution only if the damage could have been avoided by
"ordinary care" or "reasonable expense" on his part.
31bsee Lauer, 'Ihe Riparian Right as Property, supra note at 196.
3lcAnderson v. Cincinnati Southern .!sz· Co., 86 Ky. 44 (1887) (diversion)
and City of Louisville'!.:._ Tuay 297 Ky. 565,108 S.W.2d 278 (1949)
( impoundment) .
- 13 -

cases where the reasonable use rule has been applied to allocate water
between two or rrore riparians who desire to use rrore water than the stream
can supply by decreeing mutual curtailment of their present manner of

use.

The Court has only rejected the two m:,st inefficient consequences

of the natural flow theory.

The strict comnon law view was that both

diversions and :irrq;,oundments were unreasonable per se.

These views have

been explicitly rejected by the Court of Appeals in favor of the m:,re
rational position that these uses can only be held unreasonable in the
context of other canpeting uses.

The court of appeals has in dictum,

rowever, adopted a general formulation of the reasonable use rule. In
32
Is.ughtery v. City of Lexington plaintiff desired to construct a m:>tel
and restaurant on riparian land above the city of Lexington's reservoir.
The city of Lexington denied the necessary building permit and the court
of appeals sustained the denial because plaintiff failed to allege his
sewage disposal system would not endanger the purity of the public water
supply.

Defendant argued that he was entitled to lIBke reasonable use of

his property as a riparian and argued that his proposed use would be reasonable.

In the course of its opinion the court quoted from a Michigan case

which defined reasonable use in the following terms.

In the course of the
33
opinion the court quoted with approval from a Michigan case which said
"But in determining whether a use is reasonable we must consider what the
use is for, its extent, duration, necessity, and its application; the nature

and size of the stream, and the several uses to which it is put ; the extent
of the injury to the one proprietor and of the benefit to the other; and

32 249 S.W.2d 775 (Ky. 1952).
33People v. Hurbert, 131 Mich. 156, 170, 91 N.W. 211, 217 (1902).
- 14 -

all other facts which may bear upon the reasonableness of the use."
Vague as this formulation is, it does give some indication of the factors
a court would use in making an allocation of a stream between competing
riparians.

DEFINTIION OF A WATER COURSE
The common law attached different consequences to different categories
of water.
and ( 2)

The two major classifications were:

The former was considered the property of the owner of the land

.
on which
they were found. 34

:

[

diffused surface water,

water flowing in a natural stream or standing in a watercourse such

as a lake.

~

Cl)

The latter were the oommon property of all

land owners adjacent to the stream and allocated by the doctrine of riparian
rights.
The difference between the two basic classifications is buried

in

history and a full historic examination of the development of these doctrines
is beyond the scope of this paper.

Their primary m::x:l.ern importance is

that they serve to define the Division of Water's jurisdiction.

K.R.S.

151.120 limits the Division's jurisdiction to public water which is defined
as "Water occuring in any stream, lake, ground water, subterranean water,
or other body of water in the Commonwealth which may be applied to any

[
[

L
L
L
L

useful and beneficial purpose

" Diffused surface water is not public

water "and the owner of land on which such water falls shall have a right
to its use."
K.R.S. 151.100(5) defines diffused surface water as "that water

which comes fran falling rain or melting snow or ice, and which is diffused

34 c1ark, ed., Waters and Water Rights, section 52l(A) (1967).
- 15 -

over the surface of the gn:iund, or which t~rarily flows vagrantly upon
or over the surface of the gn:iund as the natural elevations and depressions
of the surface of the earth may guide it, until the water reaches a stream or
watercourse."

K.R.S. 151.100(4) defines a stream or watercourse as "any

river, creek or channel having well defined banks, in which water flows
for substantial periods of the year to drain a given area, or any lake or
any other l:xxly of water in the Comnonwealth."

It is not clear whether

K.R.S. 151.100(4)-(5) merely incorporates c011BIOn law or attempts to sub-stitute a rrore narrow definition of watercourse.

The comn::,n conception

of a natural watercourse is a stream flowing in a definite channel with
. wel1 def"J.ned bed. 35 The COl!BIOn law defJ.n1.t1.on,
. ' .
a bed and banks or a lake J.n
36
however, is much broader.
K.R.S. 151.100(4) could be read to limit the
Division's jurisdiction by not incorporating the many cases which have
held various types of flood waters which had left their normal channel to
be still flowing in a watercourse and thus subject to the doctrine of riparian rights.

The leading Kentucky decision on the definition of a watercourse is
37
·
Morgan~· Morgan.
Defendant sought to build a roadway across Twin Creek
which separated his land from plaintiff's.

Plaintiff sued for damages

alleged to have resulted from the deposit of rocks and metal beneath the
roadway.

The main issue was whether defendant was entitled to an easement

of necessity.

The Court of Appeals held he was but desired to limit its

35 c1ark, ed., Waters and Water Rights section 52.l(B) (1967).
36rd.

at section 52.l(B).

37 205 Ky. 545, 266 S.W. 35 (1924).
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scope to protect pla:intiff from any flooding which might result from obstruct:ing a natural stream as his road would be built over the highwater mark.
Thus, it became necessarry if the fill was placed :in a natural stream :in
order to detennine if it was entitled to protection as a riparian.

The

court held that pla:intiff could compel the removal of the obstructions if
she could prove probable :injury because they were placed with:in the boundaries
of a natural stream.

It defined a stream as follows:

"A 'watercourse' in the legal sense of the term does not
necessarily consist merely of the stream as it flows with:in
the banks which form channel in ord:inary states of water.
When, :in time of ord:inary high water, the stream, extending
beyond its banks, is accustomed to flow down over the adjacent
lowlands in a broader, but still def:inable stream, it still has
the characteristic of a watercourse, and the law relat:ing to water
courses is applicable, rather than that relat:ing to mere surface
water."

38

Morgan illustrates that the hydrologic problems which will give the
court the most trouble in def:ining the Division's jurisdiction will result
from flooding and overflow situations.

l
l
L
L
L
L

It is difficult to define at what

point waters which rise above the normal level of the stream cease to be
water flowing in a natural stream or watercourse and become diffused surface waters.

There are two criteria the courts use

(1)

the area covered

by the flow, and (2) the continuity and frequency of the flow.

It is clear

that at common law water does not automatically become diffused surface
water when it leaves the normal channel.

38 266 S.W. at 36.
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If the court finds that there is

an =a which is regularly subject to flooding or overflows, it has often
been held that this constitutes a natural stream or watercourse. 39 The
question is obviously one of degree and the court is less likely.to make
this finding as the water spreads farther away from its normal channel.
If the overflow is limited to a section of the stream,. the court is less
likely to classify the water as diffused than if the water never returns
to the normal channel or fonns a channel with definable banks. For example,
40
in a recent California case defendant impounded what he alleged to be
diffused surface waters.

Plaintiff, a downstream riparian, sued alleging

interference with his rights claiming that the waters were part of a stream
system.

The court held that the defendant was entitled to the waters because

they did not enter the reservoir by a well defined channel or watercourse
and thus were diffused surface waters.
The definition of a watercourse adopted by the court of appeals in
l-brgan could be held to be precluded by K.R.S. 151.100(4).

Morgan holds

that a stream can be a watercourse when it leaves its banks if the flow

lll3.i.ri-

tains a definite course, while 100(4) could be read to confine the corrmission's
jurisdiction to water within the banks of the stream.

Flood water could thus

be captured without the necessity of obtaining a permit from the Division.

If K.R.S. 151.100(4) is narrowly read the Division will be deprived
of jurisdiction over a potentially large source of water.

There is evidence

that the legislature did not intend to substitute a new definition for
39

Macanber v. Godfrey, 108 Mass. 219 (1871) discussed in Ccmronwealth
of Massachusetts, legislative Research Council Report relative to Rights
to Surface and Sub-Surface Water in Massachusetts 29 (1957).
40 South Santa Clara Valley Water Conservation Dist. v. Johnson,
231 Cal. App.2d 388, 41 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1964).
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the common law definition of water course.

K.R.S. 151.120(1) and (2)

appears to create two classes of water,public and private.

Diffused

surface water is private and is defined as "water which flows Vagl'.'antly
over the surface of the ground . • . 11 This appears to 1:e a codification
of the ocmmon law definition, while public water is water flowing or standing
in a watercourse as defined by K.R.S. 151.100(4).

If 151.100(4) is not

read to incorporate the broadest camroc,n law definition of watercourse,
Ch. 151 creates three classes of water, public, private, and flood waters
subject to the doctrine of riparian rights.
legislature intended to this result.

There is no evidence that the

Rather it is more logical to assume

it intended to substitute allocation by permit for the riparian system
except where the common law was specifically retained in K. R. S. 151.120.
Either K.R.S. 151.100(4) should 1:e construed by the courts to incorporate
the common law definition of a watercourse or it should 1:e amended to do
so.

Too other frequently litigated issues are (1) the point at which a
watercourse 1:egins , and ( 2) the frequency of the flow required to constitute
a watercourse.

In Kentucky the issues will often arise to determine if

the flow of a series of springs has 1:ecome a natural stream.

[

I
L
L
L
L

For example,

in Winters v. Berea College the college erected a dam across its land at
the location of five underground springs.

A riparian on a stream 1:elow the

dam site sued alleging interference with her rights and it 1:ecame necessary
to classify the water.

The court held that riparian had the burden of

proof and that the evidence failed to prove the existence of a watercourse.

41

349 S.W.2d 357 (Ky. 1961).
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It showed only that there was a hollow below the dam which had a few pot
holes which contained water after a rain"

The absence of any showing of

periodic flow down the hollow seems to be the basis for the court's holding.

In the course of its opinion it defined the conmencement of a watercourse
as follows:
"It has been stated that surface water becomes a natural
watercourse at the point where it begins to form a reasonably welldefined channel, with a bed and banks, or sides and current,
although the stream itself may be very small and the water may not
flow continuously.

So, while the term 'water course' does not

ordinarily include water descending from hills, down rollows and
ravines , only in times of rain and rnelting snow, yet where water,
owing to the hilly and rrountainous configuration of the country,
accUIIllllates in large quantities from such courses, and at regular
seasons descends through long, deep gullies or ravines on the
land below, and in its onward flow carves out a distinct and welldefined channel, which bears the unmistakable irrqiress of the frequent
action of running water, and through which it has flowed from time
immemorial, such stream constitutes a water course and is governed
42
by the rules applicable thereto "56 Pm. Jur. 498 (Water 8).
The issues in these cases will be more factual than legal.

The

doctrines ennunciated by the courts can only provide future courts and
administrators with rough guidelines.

Precise definitions can only come

through case by case adjudications of concrete problems.
42

Id. at 358.
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There is a need to re-examine the utility of incorporating COJlllIDn
law classifications into Ch. 151.

The classification of waters should

be based on the nature of the claim asserted against them rather than on
historic distinctions which have become artificial.

r

surface water was considered a liability and not an asset.

It was some-

thing to be gotten rid of before it did extensive damage to the surface
LJ.3

of one's property.·

[~

Historically diffused

Thus, the rules governing its use (discussed infra)

are designed to adjuciate property damage claims by fixing liability between
landowners rather than to allocate a scarce resource.

It has been frequently

stated by the courts in dictum that the upper riparian can impound all the

[

diffused surface water flowing across his land regardless of the detriment
44
suffered by a lower riparian although no Kentucky case so holds.
This
rule will be unsound as diffused surface water increasingly becomes an
important source of water supply and must be allocated am::,ng competiting users.
It should, however, be noted that considerable coordination can presently
be achieved through judicial or administrative use of the elastic definitions
of natural stream or watercourse.

I
I
I
L
L
L
L

Large quantities of flood water are

potentially subject to public regulation i f the Division of Water follows
the lead of the Court of Appeals and broadly interprets the meaning of
natural stream or watercourse.
Chapter 151 should be amended to achieve the coordination of all
potential sources of water supply.

The Model Water Use Act includes the

following provision designed to achieve hydrologic coordination:

43

The comnon law doctrines are extensively discussed in Iblson,
Diffused Surface Water and Riparian Rights: Legal Doctrines in Conflict,
1966 Wis. L. Rev. 58.
44For a discussion of the comnon law rule see Maloney and Flager, Diffused
Surface Water: Scrouge or Bounty? 8 Natural Resources J. 72, 108-111 (1968).
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After the effective elate of this Act, no reservoir, dam,
embankment, pond, or other device or structure for impounding
or collection of diffused surface waters where the arrount of
water so impounded or collected exceeds [

]acre-feet may be

constructed or established unless a permit has been obtained
from the Carrunission.

The Carrunission is authorized to issue

. .

.

general and specific permJ.ts.

45

The comnents following the section give the foliowing reason for
the coordination.
In order to secure intelligent management of the uses of
the waters of the state and to avoid interference with these
uses when made in accordance with the Act, it is necessary for
the Commission to have power over all water resources which
reasonably could cause interference with uses sanctioned by
the Act.

This section recognizes the scientifically established

fact that all waters whether above, upon, or beneath the earth
are part of one hydrological cycle and that an interference
with one phase of the cycle affects other phases.

Specifically,

an interference with the flow of diffused surface water affects
the flow of streams and lakes since great arrounts of water
found in these collected bodies reach them in the form of
diffused surface water.

By giving the Commission control

over any substantial interference with the flow of diffused
surface water, the plans of the Carrunission for develoµnent
of the waters of the state under the permit system will be

45

Model Water Use Act

402 (1958).
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secure.

Further, conflicts which may arise between users of

stream and lake supplies and users of diffused surface supplies
can be avoided by allowing the Commission power to plan and
regulate all the waters of the state. 46
The reasons are sound and KRS 151.120(2) should be amended to provide
that a person wishing to impound or divert diffused surface waters must
. 47
secure a pe:rnut.
DEFillITION OF RIPARIAN 1AND

It is axiorratic that riparian rights attach only to riparian lands.
The generally accepted definition of a riparian owner is that "A riparian
owner is an owner of land bounded by a watercourse or through which a
stream flows, and generally only such an owner may claim or exercise

I.
r·
I

riparian rights which are those rights which actually touch on the water-48
course or through which the watercourse flows."
This definition is
incorporated into K.R.S. 151.210, discussed infra, which gives certain
preferences and rights to owners of land contiguous to a public stream.
The definition of a watercourse has been previously discussed and
often it will be necessary to find the existence of a watercourse before
it can be determined if the land is riparian.
It is generally accepted that riparian land must be within the

I
L

L
L
L

watershed of the stream if the diversion threatens the reasonable uses
46

Model Water Use Act

402 COJJIUent (1958).

47 Iowa and Mississippi have enacted coordination statutes. T'ne
right to use diffused surface waters is conditioned on the maintenance of
an average minimum flow for downstream users. Iowa Code 455A.27 (Supp.
1964) and Miss. Code Ann.
5956-02(i) (1958).
48
Pmnstrong v. Westroads Development Co., 380 S.W.2d 529 (Mo. 1964).
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being rrade by riparians within the watershed. 49
The division of a tract of land into tracts which are no longer
contiguous to the stream destroys the riparian right under the California
rule 50 but not under the Oregon rule. 51 The California rule is that "The
riparian right extends only to the Slll3.llest tract held under one title
in the chain of title leading to the present owner."

The person purchasing

a non-riparian segment of a riparian tract can, of course, protect himself
52
by purchasing water rights fram the riparian at the time of the transfer.
It is probable that the Court of Appeals will adopt the California
rule if called on to decide the question although neither K.R.S. 151 nor
the cases require that result.

K. R. S. 151. 210 speaks of an owner or

owners of land contiguous to public water but does not clearly specify
i f the section applies only those presently owning contiguous land.

It

would be reasonable to asswne that "presently" is :implied for the noncontiguous owner rray obtain a permit to divert water to non-contiguous
lands if he has not obtained rights by a prior transfer.

RIGHTS TO GROUND WATER
Ground water is a source of water supply in all parts of Kentucky
but its t= principal areas of use are the Ohio River Valley strip and
the Jackson Purchase.

Its use is still Slll3.ll compared to surface water

but it is expected to increase as IIRlIU.cipalities and industries increasingly

49Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Fuller, 150 Cal. 327, 88 Pac. 978 (1907).
50 Boehmer v. Big Rock Irr. Dist., 117 Cal. 19, 1+8 Pac. 908 (1897).
51Jones v. Conn, 39 Ore. 30, 61+ Pac. 855 (1901).
5211:x:lern cases hold that riparian rights rray be served fram the land
and sold, Mianus Realty Co. v. Greenway, 151 Conn. 128, 193 A.2d 713 (1963),
but the non-riparian transferee is subject to the rule of reasonable use.
State v. Apfelbacher, 167 Wis. 233, 167 N.W. 21+1+ (1918).
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rely on wells for their supply.

r·

It is unlikely that Kentucky will ever

experience the severe over-draft problems which have plagued central
Arizona and portions of California.

However, as the use of ground water

increases, pumping in excess of the safe annual recharge may occur in
portions of the state and it will be necessary to adjudicate conflicts
among competing users.
Kentucky has never enacted legislation dealing specifically with
ground water.
the common law.

'Those conflicts which have arisen have been resolved by
Chapter 151 includes "ground water" within the definition

of public water but has no special provisions to regulate the drilling
and management of wells.

'The m:,st serious problems are pollution of ground

water supplies and certain aspects of this problem are covered by other
legislation.

[.

For example, any person desiring to drill or deepen, reopen

a plugged well for purposes of fluid injection for the production of oil
and gas must obtain a pennit from the Director of Oil and Gas Conservation
53
.
•
.
in the Department of Mines and Minerals.
Pollution of the ground water

I

supply is a factor to be considered by the Director in the issuance of the
pennit and the condition attached to it.
'The term "ground water" has no precise meaning for the hydrologist as
it had for the common law.
two categories :

[

streams.

(1)

'The common law classified "ground water" into

percolating waters and ( 2) water flowing in underground

'The consequences of the classification were that percolating

water was held to be the private property of the overlying owner and thus

L
L
L
L

subject to his exclusive use.

Water flowing in an underground stream was

governed by the law of riparian rights.
53

K.R.S. 353.570 et. seq. (1960).
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These categories have long been criticized by hydrologists and legal
scholars as artificial because they are unrelated to scientific fact.

The

basic criticism is that they ignore the interrelationship between surface
and subsurface systems and thus frustrate management programs designed to
coordinate the development of a watershed.

Thomas and wna summarize the

defects in.the common law classificatory system as follows:
"Yet it is clear that this isolation can only be maintained only when and where water is being mined frcm underground
storage.

Any water pumped from wells under equilibrium con-

ditions is necessarily diverted into the acquifer from somewhere else, perhaps from. other acquifers, perhaps from streams
and lakes, perhaps from wetlands, ideally, but not necessarily,
from places where it· was of no use to anyone.

There are

enough examples of streamflow depletion by ground-water
development and of ground water pollution from wastes released
by surface waters, to attest to the close though variable
54
relation between surface water and ground water."
Gruund water basins are generally managed to balance the rate of
withdrawal against the.rate of recharge so that an optimum time distribution can be achieved and present needs balanced against future needs.
55
The period used to determine equilibrium conditions varies.
A yearly

54Piper and Thomas. Hydrology and Water: What is Their Future
CorrJIDn Ground? Water Resources and the Law, 7 12 (1958).
55 rd. at 11-13.
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[

l

period is generally used and ground water is considered·being "mined" -the depletion of a stock resource--if the annual rate of withdrawal exceeds
.
However, longer tune
peri'ods may be used,

r:

the annual rate of recharge. 56

[

For example, it has been proposed that the State of California manage the

if withdrawals are coordinated with the use of other sources of water.

ground water basins in Southern California so that they would be drawn
down during dry cycles and replenished during years of excess run off,
Proposed management programs such as this illustrate the need to coordinate
the laws governing allocation of ground water with those governing the
allocation of surface water in order to maximize the efficiency of the
program.

[

[

The Kentucky comnon law was what is known as the "American rule" of
57
ground water. The first case Nourse v. Andrews,
adopted the strict
corrm:,n law rule rather than the American rule.
sought to enjoin defendant city from using

two

Plaintiff lower riparian
springs for its water

supply alleging that they were part of the source of a river which flowed
through plaintiff's land and thus his water supply was being depleted by
defendant's withdrawals.

The plaintiff, in effect, argued that the springs

and river were part of one water supply system and each user's right was

l
l
L
L

L
L

correlative to the others.

Unfortunately plaintiff was unable to show that

the springs affected the supply of the river.

The court adopted the comnon

law rule that all ground water is presumed to be percolating and the party

56 Bag

•
.
ley, water Rights
law and Publ ic po1·icies
Relating to Ground
Water ''Mining" in the Southwestern States , 4 J. law and Economics
144 (1961).
57
200 Ky. 467, 255 S.W. 84 (1923).
0
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f
alleging the existence of an underground stream has the burden of proof.
The court concluded that the evidence showed only that the springs were
separated from the river by a low ridge and that they continued to flow
during dry cycles while the river became only a series of stagnant pools.
The case is a correct application of the COIIIIOn law.

It is unfortunate

that the facts did not establish an interrelationship between the springs
and the river as it would have given the court an opportunity to develop
same guidelines to coordinate the use of ground and surface supplies.
The court announced the corraron law rule as follows:
"The law seems well settled that water percolating through
the soil is not, and cannot be, distinguished frcm the
soil itself.

The owner of the soil is entitled to the

waters percolating through it, and such water is not subject
to appropriation."

However, "once a stream is known to

exist the presumption is that it has a fixed and definite
channel through which it flows and which varies only with
.

,

the erosion which the water produces.

,.58

The absolute ownership rule has similar consequences to the rules

governing capture of oil and gas although the justifications vary and
logically should lead to different results.

The overlying owner has the

right to capture all the oil and gas beneath his land.

He rray create a

pressure differential and cause oil or gas to drain to his property from
adjoining tracts as long as his wells are confined within vertical planes
corresponding to the surface boundaries of his property.

The reason given

by the courts was that oil and gas are analagous ta wild anirrals and birds

58

rd. at 86.
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'
'

which constantly migrate from one place to another and thus ownership
of the tract on which they--or the oil and gas alight--is the only basis
for ownership.

The reason given by the Norse court for ownership of per-

colating water is much closer to scientific fact.

Subsurface liquids

tend to be relatively stationary and migrate only when a pressure differential
is created beneath an adjoining tract.

~
[.

The logical consequence of the Norse

court's assertion that percolating water can not be distinguished from the
soil itself is that the overlying owner could enjoin an adjacent owner from
pumping if he proved that pumping caused drainage from his land.

It could

be conceptualized as analagous to his right of trespass against anyone re-

moving soil without his consent but the Court of Appeals has applied the
59
rules of capture of oil and gas to ground water.
Each overlying owner has
a correlative right to pump and if one =eates a pressure differential
and causes drainage, the remedy of the other is to go and do likewise.

This

rule functions to the benefit of society as long as there is an abundance

[
[

of the resource or society desires to encourage rapid exploitation, but
it results in an inefficient use of the resource if there is a need to conserve it for future use.
Another consequence of the absolute ownership theory is the encouragement

I

of short-run waste.

Thus, Kentucky, as did most other American jurisdictions,

soon rrodified the strict cornm:m law rule and adopted the "American" or
"reasonable use" rule in Sycamore Coal Co. v. Stanley. 60 Plaintiff overlying landowner alleged that defendant coal company drilled a sixty (60)

I.
L
L
L

foot core hole which caused the water of plaintiff's well to disappear.
59 11 The right of the owner of land to drill wells and take percolating
water is analagous to the right of the proprietor to take oil and gas."
Sycamore Coal Co. v. Stanley, 292 Ky. 168, 169, 166 S.W.2d 293, 294 (1942).
60
292 Ky. 168, 166 S.W.2d 293 (1942).
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The defendant subsequently plugged the hole and the water in plaintiff's
well rose to fourteen inches contrasted with its former level of four
and one half feet.

Plaintiff alleged that defendant interfered with the

flow of an underground stream and thus injured plaintiff's riparian rights.
The court found no evidence of the existence of an underground channel and
treated the problem as one of determining competing rights to percolating
water.

The court denied damages but in doing so adopted the "American"

or "reasonable use" rule for future cases.
The distinction between the strict colllllOn law or "English" rule and
the "American" or "reasonable use" rule is that under the latter "the
right of the landowner to subterranean or percolating waters is limited
to a reasonable and beneficial use of the waters under his land, and he
has no right to waste them through malice or indifference, if, by such waste
he injures a neighboring land owner. "

If, however, the use of the water is

found to be "legitimate" the owner is entitled to,all he can use regardless
of the depletion caused to his neighbor's supply.
The reasonable use rule for ground water should not be confused with
the reasonable use rule applied to. surface waters.

The former reasonable

use rule does not grant each overlying owner a right to a proportionate
share of the ground water in the basin.

It merely places limited restraints

on the use <the overlying owner may make of the water.

He cannot waste it

by letting it flav from the well but as long as his use is considered

"legitimate" he is entitled to all the water he desires.

The limited scope

of the reasonable use rule is illustrated by an analogous early Kentucky
case from the law of oil and gas.

In L::iuisville Gas Co. v. Central Kentucky.
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Natural Gas

61

two a d'Jacent 1easees competed ~or
'° t he contract to supply

gas to I.Duisville.

The contract was awarded to plaintiff and defendant

retaliated by extracting large amounts of gas to manufacture carbon black.
90,000,000 cubic feet were extracted to produce a quantity lampblack worth

r

about $12.00.

The Court of Appeals enjoined the continued operation of

the factory reasoning that "plaintiff and defendant have each the right
to take gas fran the camoon source of supply, but neither lll3.Y by waste
destroy the rights of the other. 11

The reasonable use doctrine thus lll3.kes

it virtually impossible to coordinate surface rights with ground water

['

rights because it places minimal restraints on the overlying owners scope
of use.
The successful assertion of riparian rights to an underground stream
depends on a showing that the stream was a known as opposed to a hidden
underground stream.

If the overlying owner lll3.kes a reasonable use of

water supplied by underground springs he is not liable to adjoining land
owners for injuries to their wells if the springs are fed by "hidden
underground streams flowing in unknown channels or percolating waters."

62

Thus , hidden underground streams are treated by the same rules as applied
to percolating waters.
percolating.

In Kentucky all ground water is presumed to be

This means that the party asserting the applicability of

riparian rights must prove that there is an underground stream.

Once

this is proven that burden shifts to the other party to prove that it is
unknown and does not flow in a definite and fixed channel.

L
L
L
L

61117 Ky. 71, 77 S.W. 368 (1903).

62
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In Comrronwealth

. 63
.
.
•
v. Sebastian the Court of Appeals affirmed a Judgment agalilSt the
Department of Highways for interference with a known underground stream
and indicated some of the evidence which will be necessary to get a case
to the jury on this issue.

The court held that the existence of a line

of green grass which grew even in dry weather was sufficient to take the
case to the jury.
Mention should be ffi3.de of the rules developed in California to allocate
ground water.

California has a hybred law of water rights for it embraces

both the riparian and appropriative system.

Riparians have first preference

to the water and if a surplus exists, it ffi3.y be appropriated and diverted
to non-riparian lands.

As conflicts among pUlllpers became acute, the California

Supreme Court realized that both.the English comron law rule and "reasonable
64
use" rrodification were unsuited for the arid west. In Katz v. Walkinshaw
the California Supreme Court formulated the doctrine of correlative rights
which held that each overlying owner had a right to a proportionate share
of the common pool, thus applying the concepts developed to allocate
face streams to ground water basins.
among rrrunicipalities which were
lying owners.

J1Dre

In City of Pasadena v.

SUI'-

Conflicts continued to grow especially
often appropriators rather than over~

65

of Alhambra

-

· .·

the court was called

on to adjudicate rights to the Raymond basin serving much of the San Gabriel
63 345 S.W.2d 46 (1961).
64141 Cal. 116, 74 Pac. 766 (1903).
6533 Cal.2d 908, 207 P.2d 17 (1949). The problems of allocating and
conserving ground water in the Los Angeles basin are exceedingly complex.
For a discussion of the settlements reached by various claimants see Reis,
A Review and Revitalization: Concepts of Ground Water Production and Management--The California EKperience, 7 Natural Resources J. 53 (1967).
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Valley in IDs Angeles County.

r-

11:Jst claimants were appropriators seeking to

adjudicate rights because of the continued decline in the water table.

The

California Supreme Court did not attempt to determine priorities to rigorously
apply the doctrine of prior appropriation but instead developed a new theory-mutual prescription--to allocate the supply.

Each plllllper had to reduce

his withdrawals by the ratio of his rate of withdrawal for the previous five
years to the safe annual yield.
K.R.S. 151.120 appears to have abolished the common law distinction
between waters flowing in known and defined underground streams and percolating water.

All water beneath the ground is now public water and a

permit must be secured for its withdrawal.

Kentucky has thus taken a major

step toward the cocrdination of surface and ground water rights for the
interrelationship between the two systems can now be considered in the
Division's decision to deny, grant, or condition a permit.

[

The declaration that all ground water is now public water could be
challenged on the grounds that as applied to percolating waters it is an

I
I
I
I
L
L
L
L

unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation.

This argu-

ment is.stronger in the case of percolating waters than in the case of
modification of surface rights because of the repeated declarations by the
Court of Appeals that such waters are the absolute property of the overlying owner.

A n1.Dilber of western states have faced this argument in applying

the doctrine of prior appropriation to ground waters.

Early cases held

ground water appropriation statutes unconstitutional but the more recent
.
.
66
.
cases have held them constitutional.
The rationale has been that the
public interest in the efficient allocation of water resources requires

66 see State ex rel Bliss v. Dority, 55 N.M. 12, 225 P.2d 1007, appeal
dismissed, 341 U.S. 924 (1951), State ex rel Bnery v. Knapp, 167 Kan. 546,
207 P. 2d 440 (1949). Hanson v. Salt lake, 115 Utah 404, 205 P.2d 255 (1949).
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I
f
that private property rights be subject to reasonable limitations.

The

general problems of the constitutionality of Chapter 151 are discussed
infra and are applicable to the constitutionality of declaring percolating
waters public.

i
r

ACQUISITION OF RIGHTS BY PRESCRIPTION
67
Riparian rights may be acquired by prescription.

The person asserting

a prescriptive right to an ascertained anount of water lllllSt prove that his
use has been (1) open and notorious, ( 2) continuous, and ( 3) adverse to the
interests of the party against whom the prescriptive right is claimed for
the statuatory period permitted by the statute for actions to recover
interests in real property.

The period is fifteen years in Kentucky.

68

Cons~tive prescriptive rights are often difficult to assert because it
must be shown that the downstream riparian against whom the right is claimed
has suffered substantial injury as a result of the alleged adverse use.
the use is made pursuant to an agreement between the

two

If

parties, it can

not be prescriptive unless it has exceeded the scope of the agreement for
the statuatory period.
Chapter 151 does not specify the relationship between prescriptive
rights and the permit system.

It could be argued that KRS 151.150 means

that acquisition of a permit is now the exclusive method for obtaining a
water and thus prescriptive rights can not be obtained after 1967.

However,

the rrore appropriate analogy might be to the recording acts where adverse
possession has always been a recognized exception in order to protect
th:>se who have relied on the existence of firm rights based on a long period
67

erson v.

'-d
nu

68 KRS 413. 010.

c·incinnat1.
·
·

South em Ry • , 86 Ky. ""4 , 49
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r

.
actual use. 69
of continuous

. accepted by t he Court of
If t hi s analogy is

Appeals, prescriptive and the permit system are two mutually exclusive
meth:Jds of obtaining water rights.

L

[

[.

L
L
L
L

69 ror an argument that prescriptive rights should be exerrq:,ted from the
permit system see JQetzing, Prescriptive Water Rights in California: Is
Application a Prerequisite?, 39 Calif. L. Rev. 369 (1951). The contrary view
is stated in Craig, Prescriptive Water Rights in California and the Necessity
for a Valid Statuatory Appropriation, 42 Calif. L. Rev. 219 (1954).
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Chapter III

PURPOSE OF CHAPI'ER 151
KRS ch. 151 creates a new system of water rights.

It contains elements

of the riparian system and of the doctrine of prior appropriation but
does not contain all elements of either system.

Like President Franklin

D. Roosevelt's New Deal it is neither fish nor foul.

To understand the

changes made by the new system in the cannon law of riparian rights, it
is first useful to summarize briefly the chief criticisms which have been
made against it and the theories of water allocation urged by welfare
econcmists.

Structural reforms in the existing legal system have been in

response to demands for greater efficiency in the allocation of our water
resources.
The major defect in the riparian system has been its inability to
create rights to a firm quantity of water in advance of litigation.and the
fact that often water can not be transferred to non-riparian land unless
the user is able to bear the cost of purchasing the riparian land.

These

defects are not serious when there are few water shortages, but they
becone extremely serious when prolonged shortages exist or incompatible
uses are proposed.
.

Some economists maintain that the function of water
•

•

le

law is to create firm rights so that the free mar et can operate.

71

If

rights can be quantified for time and arrount, they will become freely
transferrable like any other species of property and the market will

71

.

.

.

. .

.

See, Milliman, Water Law and Private Decision Making:
2 J. Law and Econcmics 41 (1959).
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A Critique,

operate to allocate them to their optimum use.
defects in the market system.

There are of course several

For example, it does not provide for the

allocation of rights which may have little or no market value but which
should be recognized.

The preservation of·a wild river is a good example

of the kind of use which would not be achieved under the market system but
which may be.in the public interest.
Thus, there is a need for some state modification of the corrrnon law of
riparian rights i f water is to be.put to its most efficient use and the
public interest protected.

Chapter 151 contains a lengthy statement of

purpose which states the Cornnonwealth's intention to regulate future uses
of water in broad and sweeping teilllS.
151.110 Water Resources, Policy Stated.
The conservation, development and proper use of the water
resources of the Commonwealth of Kentucky has become of vital
~ortance as a result of population expansion and concentration, industrial growth, technological advances and an ever
increasing demand on water for varied industrial, rrrunicipal
and recreational uses.

It is recognized by the General

Assembly that excessive rainfall during certain seasons of

[

the year causes damages from overflowing streams.

However,

prolonged droughts at other seasons curtail industrial,
rrrunicipal, agricultural and recreational uses of water and

L
L.
L.

seriously threaten the continued growth and economic well
being of the Cornnonwealth.

The advancement of the safety,

happiness and welfare of the people and the protection of
property require that the power inherent in the people be
utilized to prom:ite and to regulate the conservation, development and most beneficial use of the water resources.

L
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It is

hereby declared that the general welfare requires that the water
resources of the Cornmonwealth be put to the beneficial use to
the fullest extent of which they are capable, that the waste or
non-beneficial use of water be prevented, and that the conservation and beneficial use of water be exercised in the interest of
the people.

Therefore, it is declared the pclicy of the Comnonwealth

to actively encourage and to provide financial, technical or other
support for projects that will control and store

O\Jl'.'

water resources

in order that the continued growth and development of the Cornrronwealth
might be assured.

To that end, it is declared to be the purpose

of KRS Chapters 146, 149, 151, 262 and 350.029 and 433.750 to
433. 757 for the Commonwealth to permit, regulate, and participate
in the construction or financing officialities to store surplus
slll'.'face water for futlll'.'e use; to conserve and develop the ground water
resources of the 0:mronwealth; to protect the rights of all persons equitably and reasonably interested in the use and availability of water; to prohibit the pollution of water resources
and to maintain the nonnal flow of all streams so that the proper
quantity and quality of water will be available at all times to
the people of the O:mronwealth; to provide the adequate dispcsition of water am:,ng the people of the Comnonwealth entitled
to its use dlll'.'ing severe droughts or times of emergency; to
prevent harmful overflows and flooding; to regulate the construction, maintenance and operation of all dams and other
barriers of streams; to prevent the obstruction of streams
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and floodways by the dumping of substances therein; to keep
accurate records on the amount of water withdrawal from
streams and watercourses and reasonably regulate the amount
of withdrawal of public water; and to engage in other activities as may be necessary to conserve and develop the water
resources of the Comronwealth of Kentucky.
'!he primary purpose of this section was to establish a firm basis
for state regulation in the event of a constitutional challenge to the
statute but it also gives some indication of the scope of contemplated
public regulation.

KRS 151.110 theoretically envisions an active role

for the state for it touches on alrrost all aspects of water planning and
regulation.

'!his is reenforced by the declaration that the state's police

power must be used both "to prorrote and to regulate the conservation,

L

development and m:Jst beneficial use of the water resources," of the Cornrronwealth. 72

'!he phrase "beneficial use" is imported from Western State

constitutions and statutes which generally provide that beneficial use is
the basis, the measure, and the limit of the right to use water.

'!he term

has never been precisely defined and functions muc.'1 the same as the concept
of reasonable use in the doctrine of riparian rights.

It defines broad

l

categories of use which are deemed·socially desirable by the state.

[

at best it can serve to define outer limits of the individual's right to
72
use water in order to prevent the wasteful use of natural resources. a

L
L
L
L

does not, however, incorporate precise criteria for allocating water.

72

It
Thus,

'Ihe Division is empowered to study existing problems in the area and,
with the approval of the Department of Natural Resources, propose any needed
legislation. KRS 151.220 (2)
72 ~
151.110 (1966) states that one of the reasons for enacting the
statute was to prevent "the waste or nonbeneficial use of water ••.• "
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For example, in 1926 the California Supreme Court held that a riparian was
entitled to the seasonable overflow in order to irrigate uplands and thus
73
. d to l.Jlst
. all cost1y J.rT1gat1on
. .
.
was require
works.
The consequences of
this h:>lding meant that downstreair, riparians and appropriators would often
have lit_tle water during the spring although much larger am:iunts would be
available if the upper riparian were limited to water actually needed to
raise his crops.

The specter of a full scale return. to the natural flow theory

lead to the enactment of Article 28, section 3 of the California Constitution
which provided, "It is hereby declared that because of the conditions prevailing in this state the general welfare requires that the water resources
of this State be put to beneficial use . • • and that waste or unreasonable
74
use or unreasonable methods of use be prevented • • • • " The California
Supreme Court subsequently held that a riparian had no "natural right"
to the full use of the seasonable overflow and was entitled only to a proportionate share of the overflow. Claims were to be adjusted by the
75
concept of reasonable use.
Herminghouse and the subsequent revision of

73

.

.

.

.

Herm:inghaus v. Southern California Edison Co., 200 Cal. 81,
252 Pac. 607 (1926) cert. denied 275 U.S. 486 (1927).
74 eai. Constitution Art. 28, Section 3 (1928).
75Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2 Cal.2d 351, 40 P.2d 486 (1935).
See also Mare Irrigation Dist. v. Llndsay-Stratrrore Irrigation Dist. ,
3 Cal.2d 489, 45 P.2d 972 (1935). The cases are also notable for their
errphasis on engineering rather than legal solutions as the preferred
method of settling water use conflicts. The court held that the 1928
amendment contained the power to :inq:,lement a physical solution to allocate
the water am:Jng the respective claimants.
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the California constitution illustrate the limitations the state may impose
on water use to promote its "beneficial use."

The state may limit the right

to use water to the minimum rather than the maximum amount necessary to
support the activity in order to achieve an optimum allocation among the
greatest numbers of claimants.

The reasonable use rule of riparian rights

also gives the court the power to limit individual use practices which seem
wasteful in view of the large numbers of competing demands on the resource.
Thus, under both comnon law and KRS Ch. 151 the state has the power to curtail excessive water use demands.

[

L

L
L
L
L
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Chapter IV

STRUCTURE OF WA'IER RESOURCES PLANNING
The 1966 revision of Chapter 151 created a Division of Water within
the Department of Natural Resources.
basic functions:

(1)

Water Resources, (2)

The Division of Water has three

L:,ng range planning for the use of the Conm:mwealth's
Implementation of state water plans, and (3)

Adjudication of Individual Claims.

This section will analyze the structure

of the Division in an attempt to determine it has been organized in a
manner which will allow it to carry out its functions efficiently.

To

do this it will be useful to compare relatively simple structure of water
resources planning and regulation in Kentucky with the ccmplex planning
and regulatory structures created in California.
California has three separate bodies to plan and implement its state
.
76 . (1)
water po1 icy:

The California Water Canrnission, (2) The State Water

Rights Board, and (3) The Department of Water Resources within the Resources
Agency.

The California Water Canmission is to serve as the long range

planning agency.

It is canposed of public citizens and it was conceived

as a watchdog over the Department of Water Resources.

The basic powers

of the Canmission are the right to file appropriations on all 1113.jor sources
of unappropriated water and then to release these priorities to agenc~es
in accordance with the California State Water Plan.

76

See Strauss and Murphy, California Water I.aw in Perspective
West's Annotated California Water Codes 1 - 36 - 40 (1956).
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l

Kentucky has no equivalent authority.
Kentucky Water Resources Authority.

Chapter 151 creates a

The Authority is composed of the

Governor, the Comnissioner-afNatural Resources , the Comnissioner of Health,
the Comnissioner of Corrrnerce, the Carrrnissioner"afAgriculture, and the
Attorney General.

The Authority is empowered to engage in long range

. 77 but its chief function is to act as the state agency for
plannJ.ng
O

contracting with the Corps of Engineers for water supply space in their
.
.
77a
.
.
multipurpose reservoirs.
Such an agency has neither the tJJne or the
technical skills to engage in long range water resources planning.
However, as water supplies become roc,re scarce in Kentucky, the state may
wish to consider the creation of an agency canposed of citizen members to
formulate policy for the long range use of the state's water resources • The

[

first step would be to create a body whose powers were advisory only.

r

77 KRS 151.130 (1966)
The water Resources Authority of Kentucky is ~owered to co-ordinate
the programs of all state agencies in the conservation, development and
wise use of public water. KRS 151.360 (2) Its principal powers are:
Cl) The oonstruction and regulation of water resource projects within
the Comrronwealth, KRS 151.370 (1966). (2) The purchase and exercise of
the rights of emninent domain for the right to use lands selected by
the Authority for water resources projects, KRS 151.370 (2) (1966)
(3) To issue revenue bends to pay for the projects, as well as to
charge and oollect revenues for the use of the services and facilities
of projects, .KRS 151.370 (3,4) (1966). (4) To make and enter into
such agreements with the Federal Government, the Commonwealth, or any
other political subdivisions incidental to the execution of its other
enumerated powers. KRS 151.370 (8) (1966).

l

l
L
L
L.

L.

77 ~e Division is concentrating its efforts on a five year data
gathering and analysis program in order to acquire the factual basis
necessary to coordinate the development of the state's water resources.
The program is described in Department of Natural Resources, Division
of Water, Water Resource Planning in Kentucky 92 - 95 (1967).
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California separates the adjudicative function from the planning
and implementation function.
State Water Rights Board.

Permits to appropriate are handled by the

The Board receives applications for permits

to appropriate, holds hearings , and decides whether to grant or deny the
permit.

A separate adjudicative body is necessary in a water-short state

because of the many conflicting demands on a limited resource.

The

judicial nature of the California State Water Rights Board procedures
also insures that a greater nUIIlber of interested parties will be heard.
For example, an applicant in California has to publish his application
at his own expense while in Kentucky the applicant is not required to do so. TJ-e
statute provides no procedure for public hearings.on permit applications.
The Division of Water performs both an adjudicatory and planning
function.

It is empowered to issue permits for the withdrawal of water

as well as to formulate long range plans for the use of the state's water.
At the present time the Division's functions are confined to data gathering
.
77a
However, a potential
and analysis and review of federal water plans.
conflict between the division's functions may exist in the future.

The

Division is charged both with protecting private and public interests.
It can issue permits to private individuals as well as plan and implement
state projects.

This could lead to situations where it would be faced

with a conflict of interest situation in deciding to issue or deny a
permit.

If these situations arise with any frequency, it may be necessary

to separate the adjudication function from the planning function by the

77~e Division is concentrating its efforts on a five year data
gathering and analysis program in order to acquire the factual basis
necessazy to coordinate the development of the state's water resources.
The program is described in Department of Natural Resources, Division
of Water, Water Resource Planning in Kentucky 92 - 95 (1967).
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I
I
I

creation of a quaisi-judicial agency to hear permit applications.

The

public interest would be represented before the adjudication agency by
the Division of Water and private interests might be better served i f
permit applications were heard by an impartial administrative body.

r
I:

The most important water resources planning and program implementation
in Kentucky will be done by the United States Army Corps of Engineers.
The Corps has jurisdiction over navigable waters within the state.

This

jurisdiction stems from the corrrnerce clause and an unbroken chain of Supreme
1·

Court decisions has given the Corps almost unlimited power to plan and
construct ITD.llti-purpose reservoirs for flood control, ITD.lnicipal water
78
supply, and recreation.
The Corp's power over the navigable waters of

I

I
[

I.
L
L
L

78 In U.S. v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (l898) the
Supreme Court held that the federal government could enjoin the construction
of a dam whose purpose was to impound water for irrigation which was located
in the non-navigable headwaters of a navigable river because downstream
navigability would be effected. As improvement of navigation became a
secondary purpose for federal intervention, the Supreme Court developed the
fiction that as long as some relationship between navigability (which was
early defined as water vmich was navigable in fact for purposes of corrunerce,
The Daniel Bell, 10 Wall 557 (1870) and corrunerce.was shown the project
could be operated for other "incidental" purposes such as flood control and
storage. The·Supreme Court almost abandoned the fiction in the First
Arizona against California litigation, 283 U.S. 423 (1931) by holding first
that if the river was once used for navigation and subsequently abandoned,
the federal government had the power to restore the river for that use.
The significance of the opinion, h::,wever, was its sweeping declaration that
as long as some nexus between navigation and the project was shown all other
incidental uses, even i f they were in fact the main purposes for the project,
were validated. In making this sweeping grant of power the Court indicated
that they would not undertake a detailed review of congressional declaration
of navigability. Federal jurisdiction was extended to the non-navigable
tributaries of a navigable stream in Oklahoma ex rel Phillips v. Guy F.
Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (194l). The final blow to the navigation fiction
was dealt in l965 when the Supreme Court held that the Federal Power Comnission
could assert jurisdiction over a project vmich would be built on a nonnavigable tributary of a navigable stream for the purposes of generating
power to be sold in interstate commerce but vmich would have no effect on
downstream navigability. FPC v. Union Electric, 381 U.S. 90 (1964). Comerce
rather than navigability is n= the basis of federal jurisdiction. See
generally Morreale, Federal Power over Western Waters, the Navigation Power
and tre Rule of No Compensation, 3 Natural Resources J. l-l3 (1963).
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the state is a pararrount to that of the state.

They are required by statute

to give state agencies an opportunity to review project proposals but the
state has no power to compel or reJect a proJect, 79 Furth er, the Corps
•

0

I

has the power to administer the distribution and use of water according to

regulations and policies which rray conflict with state law.

80

[

Although

the Corp' s power is great, they 'hcM:: not chosen to use it in a rranner to
engender bitter federal-state conflicts as has been the case between the
U.S. Bureau of Reclarration and the western states.

The Corps has rrade i;t

r

a policy of obtaining local and state approval prior to construction of a
81
project and thus the style of Corps-state relations is generally harnonious.

79

Mx>cly v. Texas Water Comn:i.ssion, 373 S.W.2d 793 (Texas 1963).

80 see Goldberg, Interposition - Wild West Water Style, 17 Stan.
L. Rev. 1 (1964) for a discussion of the cases.
81see U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Procedures for Conception,
Authorization, and Construction of Projects, Survey Investigation and
Reports: General Procedures, Engineering Manual EM 1120-2 101 (1964);
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Chapter V

FUNCTION OF PERMIT SYSTEM
The Kentucky pennit system can serve three functions in the allocation of the state's water:

r
l
L
[
[

(1)

It can provide a means of securing accurate data on the am::iunt

of water presently being used.

82

This data can be correlated with stream

flow and ground water infonnation so that accurate projections about
future use and demand can be made.

The primary purpose for passage of

the statute was to provide a means of gathering this data and this will
83
remain the chief function of the statute during its early years.
( 2)

It can provide a means of ooordinating water resource develop-

ment so that the wasteful duplication of facilities can be prevented.
For example, if two public agencies or private entities desire to build
substantially identical protects which would serve the same class of
users , the Division could grant the pennit which, in their discretion,
-·
. 84
ha s the rrost f avorable cost-benefit ratio.

[

l
L
L.

L
L.

Courts have interpreted the

82

KRS 151.220 (1966) authorizes the Division of Water to undertake a
research program in order to formulate a state-wide flood control and
water development program. The Division is given the authority to undertake continuous studies and to corporate with local, other state, and
federal agencies involved in water resources planning and development.
831.ouisvi
. '11e Courier
'
Journal, Sunday, August 6, 1967, Sec. F.,
p. 3, col. 3.
84 see Tanner v. Bacon, 103 Utah 494, 136 P.2d, 957 discussed in
Trelease. Policies For Water: Property, Rights, Economic Forces, and Public
Regulation. S. Natural Resources J. 1, 17 (1965).
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permit system for appropriations to empower state agencies to grant
only one of

two

or more competing applications because it has the most

favorable cost-benefit ratio.
(3)

The permit system can provide an administrative means of

adjudicating rights between competing private parties, competing public
agencies or combinations of the two.

The extent to which KRS Ch. 151

substitutes a new system of water rights for the riparian system is not
clear, but the statute can rationally be construed to substitute administrative for judicial adjudication for KRS 151.110 specifies that regulation
of water rights is one of the purposes.
All persons (public or private) desiring to withdraw, divert, or
transfer public water Imlst register with the Division of Water and
subnit an application for a permit.

However, the legal status of a

permit is not clearly delineated by KRS Ch. 151.

Kentucky has not adopted

the prior appropriation system for KRS 151.200 makes it clear that priority
of the date of the permit's issuance will not govern the allocation
of water in times of scarcity.

KRS 151.200(1) provides:

"Not withstanding the existence of any permits for the
withdrawal, diversion, or transfer of public water, in
times of drought, emergency, or other similar situations
requiring a balancing of rights and availability of water
between water users, the division, with the approval of the
authority may temporarily allocate the available public
water supply among water users and restrict the water withdrawal rights to permit holders , until such time as the
condition is relieved and the best interests of the public
are served. "
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l
!

This section is the antithesis of the doctrine of prior appropriation.
The economic utility of an appropriation permit is that the user can
estimate in advance how he will stand in times of scarcity and thus proceed through the market to acquire other rights should he need them to
protect himself.

A Kentucky permit, however, gives the holder no

basis to determine how much water he will be entitled to in times of
scarcity. All that KRS 151.200(1) does is carry over the most economically
undesirable features of the riparian system.

The only perceivable

change is that determinations of reasonable use are now made by administrative
rather than judicial forums.

This section will be discussed infra.

It is, however, clear that substantial modifications in the riparian
system were implemented.

KRS 151.200(2) abolishes, for example, the

restriction that withdraws must be used within the watershed if other
riparians could be injured by a trans-basin diversion.

The Division

may now issue a permit for the transfer of public water fran "one stream
or watershed area to another, where such transfer is consistent with
the wise use of the public water of the Ccmnonwealth and is in the best
interests of the public. 11

The watershed restriction has been one of the

most criticized features of the riparian system and will be discussed
infra.
The relationship between KRS 151 and the riparian system is further

L
L
L
L
L

confused by the description of the rights conferred by a permit contained in KRS 151.170(1).

It

provides that all permits issued . . •

shall be specific in terms of quantity, time, place and rate of diversion,
transfer or withdrawal of public water."

This looks like an attempt

to quantify water rights and thus evidences a legislative intent to
- 49 -

replace the riparian system.

However, this inference is not supported

by the next sentence of the statute which reads, "Such permits represent
a limited right of use and do not vest ownership nor an absolute right to
withdraw or use the water."

This section makes it unclear whether the

permit supercedes or merely complements the riparian system with a regis'tration system designed to gather information.
The dcrninant purpose behind the enactment of KRS ch. 151 was to
secure adequate data for future water resources planning. 85

If this were

the only purpose, then it =uld be logical to conclude that the permit
system is designed only to give the Division accurate water data and
does not supercede the doctrine of riparian rights.

However, there are

substantial modifications in the corrmon law doctrine--the abolition of
the watershed rule and the distinction between percolating ground water
and ground water in a subsurface stream support the rational inference
that the permit system was intended to supercede the comrron law except

85 KRS 151.160 provides: (1) All public water withdrawn pursuant to
a permit under KRS 151.140, must be recorded and a report thereof kept and
sent to the division as hereinafter provided. (2) Beginning July 1, 1967,
all persons, business, industries, cities, counties, water districts and
other political subdivisions withdrawing, diverting or transferring
public water under a permit from the division, must record the am::iunt
of water withdrawn, diverted or transferred each day. Quarterly reports,
on forms to be supplied by the division, indicating am::iunts of public
water withdrawn, diverted or transferred, shall be timely sul::mitted to
the division. (3) The division or any of its authorized representatives
shall have the right to enter and inspect water withdrawal records at all
times to determine whether such records are correct and in proper order.
(4) The willful failure to keep accurate records of the withdrawal,
diversion, or transfer of public water or the failure to timely sul::mit
quarterly reports upon demand by the division shall subject the permit
holder to being called for a hearing before the division and possible
penalties under KRS 151.990.
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where it is specifically preserved by an exemption.

This inference is

further supported by the existence of Sections 150 and 160 as well as
llO's statement of policy.

Section 150 states in general terms the require-

ment that every person desiring to use public water must secure a permit,
while Section 160 specifically empowers the Division to gather accurate
data by requiring quarterly reports of withdrawals actually made under
the permit and giving the Division the right to inspect withdrawal
records.

'Ihe two separate sections are evidence that the legislature

contemplated that the function of the pennit system would be both regulatory
and information gatheringo
The legal status of a pennit should be clarified by the legislature.
The statute should clearly indicate whether the legislation is designed
solely to facilitate data gathering for public planning or whether the
pennit gives the holder a property right to use the allotted a:rrount of
water and thus creates a new system of water rights.

As the following

discussion of the permit procedure and exemptions will indicate the
present statute is a hodgepodge of riparian rights, prior appropriation,
the Iowa permit system, and several novel concepts.

All these add up to

an incomplete water use regulation statute in need of substantial clari-

I

fication.

I_

L
L

L
L
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Chapter VI
OPERATION OF PERMIT SYSTEM
EXEMPI'IONS

KRS 151.140 provides:
No person, business, industry, city, county, water
district, or other political subdivision shall have the
right to withdraw, divert, or transfer public water from
a stream, lake, ground water source or other body of
water, unless such person, business, industry, city, county,
water district or other political subdivision has been
granted a pennit by the division for such withdrawal, diversion, or transfer of water.
The definition of public water expands the previous statutory
definition.

K.R.S. 262.680 provided:

"Water occuring in any natural stream, natural lake or other
natural water body in the Comnonwealth which may be applied
to any useful and beneficial purpose is hereby declared to
be a natural resource and public water of the Corrm:>nwealth
and subject to control and regulation for the public welfare."
K.R.S. 151.120 now provides:
[151.120 Public Water of Cormnonwealth, What Constitutes.]
(1)

Water occurring in any stream, lake, ground water, sub-

terranean water or other body of water in the Cormnonwealth
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which may be applied to any useful and 'beneficial purpose
is hereby declared to be a natural resource and public water

r:

of the Comrronwealth and subject to control or regulation

[

149, 151, 262 and 350.029 and 433.750 to 433.757.

for the public welfare as provided in KRS Chapters 146,

(2)

Diffused surface water which flows vagrantly over

the surface of the ground shall not be regarded as public
water, and the owner of land on which such water falls or
flows shall have the right to its use.

Water left standing

in natural pools in a natural stream when the natural flow
of the stream has ceased, shall not be regarded as public

L
[
r

water and the owners of land contiguous to that water shall
have the rights to its use.
86
.
The statute contains broad exemptions.
O

The exemption
.
f or :urrpoundment
.

of diffused surface waters has been previously discussed.
exemption is for domestic and agricultural uses.

The broadest

KRS 151.140 states:

Provided however, no permit shall be required and nothing
herein shall interfere with the use of water for agricultural
and domestic purposes including irrigation.

I
L

86 KRS 151.140 also exempts water injected underground in conjunction
with operations for the production of oil or gas. These uses of water
are regulated by the Department of Mines and Minerals. KRS 353.570
requires any person desiring to inject water into the ground e.g.,
for purposes of instituting a secondary recovery operation--to obtain
a permit fran the Department of Mines and Minerals. A plat of the proposed well is required and spacing requirements may be imposed by the
Department.

L
L

L
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The use of water for industrial processing or manufacturing is also
exempted provided that the water is returned in "substantially the same
quantity and condition as it is withdrawn • • • • 1187 The purpose of this
section is to exempt non-cons~tive withdrawals.

Agreeably there is

no need to regulate these types of withdrawal since by definition the
water is available for re-use downstream and the main problems with
these withdrawlas are quality rather than quantity problems.

However,

the w::irding of this sentence could cause problems for those :imnediately
downstream from the industry because there is no requirement that the
water be returned to the stream at the locus of withdrawal.

This will,

of course, be done in nost cases but a user :imnediately adjacent to the
industry could be injured if the manufacturer is given unlimited discretion in choosing his point of return.
The exemption for domestic uses is a codification of the canrnon law
and is carTied over from the 1955 statutory codification of the riparian
doctrine.

The statute defines meaning of "domestic purposes" as follows:

"The w::ird domestic purpose shall mean the use of water for ordinary
household purposes , and drinking water for poultry, livestock and domestic
1188
an:imals.
The conm:,n law domestic preference was originally limited to

87

KRS 151.140 (1966)
K. R. S. 151.12 0 also exempts "water left standing in natural
pocls in a natural stream when the natural flow of the stream has
ceased" from the definition of public water. The owners of land contiguous to the pocls have equal rights to its use.
88
KRS 151.100(10) Cf. Iowa Code, section 445A.l (1962) which limits
the domestic preference and exemption to "Ordinary household purposes,
use of water for poultry, livestock, and danestic animals . • • " See Hines,
A Decade of Experience Under the Iowa Water Permit System--Part 1, 7
Nat. Resources J. 499, 508-509 (1967).
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the ordinary needs of a single household and livestock necessary to
support it and Section 100(2) appears to incorporate this definition
range 89

The uses allowable under the domestic preference will not

affect a significant amount of water and little is lost if such
withdrawals are not included in a regulatory scheme.

However, some

courts have applied the domestic preference to institutions and commercial
resorts. 90

This is an unwarranted extension of the cOJill!Dn law preference

and should not follow under KRS 151.100(10).

If a comprehensive regulatory

scheme is to be implemented, the preference should be confined to small
91
withdrawals related to a single household.
The exemption for all
agricultural uses including irrigation greatly expands the previous law.
It was commonly assumed that the domestic preference would be limited to
water for the immediate household needs of the farmer and would not be

I:

extended to water for an ag-business such as irrigation of tobacco and
stock watering as it now is.

The reason for the exemption is undoubtedly

the immense political muscle of the Farm Bureau which views with extreme

I
I
I
L
L
L
L

alarm any regulation of farm activities.

Similar exemptions, for example,

were obtained in the 1966 revision of planning and zoning enabling

89 It has been assumed that the domestic preference would not
apply to corrrnercial agricultural operations. See Water Rights I.aw
in Kentucky, Legislative Research Carrnission, Research Publication
23, 8 (1965).
90Prather v. Hoberg, 24 Cal.2d 549, 150 P.2d 405 (1944), The cases
are split on the right of state institutions to qualify for the preference,
See Trelease, The Concept of Reasonable Beneficial Use in the I.aw of
Surface Streams, 12 Wyo. L.J. 1, 4 (1957).
91under the Mississippi appropriation system the exemption for
domestic uses is provided but the user may establish a statutory right.
Miss. Code Ann. §5956-04(a) (1956).
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legislation. 92

There is no economic or social justification for the

exemption and it should be eliminated as soon as political circumstances
permit.

Agriculture is increasingly becaning a business rather than a

way of life.

Voluntary sales of farm land are resulting in the increased

consolidation of tracts in order that economics of scale can be achieved
in farming operations.

Larger arrounts of water will be diverted for

agricultural purposes and this exemption could frustrate state-wide
cocrdination of water use for a potentially large source of supply will
be unregulated. 93

KRS 151.210(2) provides that the owner or groups of owners of
land contiguous to public water who are operating under a withdrawal
permit have the right to impound such water behind a dam in the natural
stream bed or on their land "when the flow of the stream or level of the
lake is such that impounding will not impair existing uses, or will not
interfere with the beneficial use by other water users."
this section is unclear.

The intent of

It follows the section preserving the preference

for domestic uses and could be interpreted to establish a preference
for riparian users although it does not· specifically so state.

It could

be argued that Kentucky has adopted a modified version of California's
dual system of water rights which gives riparians a preference to the water
.
93a
.
This would mean that a
and confines appropriators to surplus waters.

92 KRS 100.203(4) (1966) provides: Text provisions to the effect that
land which is used solely for agricultural, farming, dail:ying, stock-raising,
or similar purposes shall have no regulations imposed as to building permits,
certificates of occupancy, height, yard, location or courts requirements for
agricultural buildings, except that (a) setback lines may be required for
the protection of existing and proposed streets and highways, and (b) that all
buildings or structures in a designated floodway or flood plain or which tend
to increase flood heights or obstruct the flow of flood waters may be fully
regulated.
93The Department reported that tobacco is the principal crop which could
require irrigation. If a drought year occurred, sane 36,000 acres w:,uld require
4,320,000,000 gallons of water. Kentucky Water Resources, supra note'.±_ at 22.
93 <>see Duckw::lrth v. Watsonville Water Co., 170 Cal. 425, 170 Pac. 58 (1915).
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riparian permit holder would prevail over a non-riparian in times of
shortage.

However, the wording of Section 210(2) is not wholly consistent

with this analogy because the right to impound is conditioned on.noninterference with "a beneficial use by other water users."

'.This would

seem to mean that the riparian is given no preference and may only impound
if the water is available.

'.This is simply a codification of the principle

that an impoundment is not a per se unreasonable use.

If this is correct,

the section adds nothing substantive to the Chapter except to further
reassure farmers that nothing has changed.
The section may, however, have been included to implement that policy
contained in KRS 151.110 of maintaining the nonnal flow of all streams.
For example, the Iowa Water Code contains a provision requiring the regula-

[:
r,

tory agency to protect the established average minimum flow of the stream
when permits for consumptive uses are granted.

If this is the function

of Section 210(2) the division will be required to classify Kentucky's
streams according to their functions.

[

93b

The flows necessary to sustain

fish and wildlife, recreation, water quality, and downstream needs must be
calculated and form the basis for denying or granting a permit.

If this

is the purpose of the section, it should be clarified and amplified so
that the public may know the factors the division is empowered to consider
in establishing minimum flows and lake levels.

I
L
L
L
L

93bIowa Code

455A. l (1962). See Hines, A Decade of Experience
under the Iowa Water Permit System, 7 Natural Resources J. 499, 537-546
(1967) for a discussion of the problems which will be encountered in
administering minimum flows and lake levels. The special problems of
wildlife protection are discussed, Russell, A Survey of Streambank Wildlife
Habitat (Paper presented at the Twentieth Annual Meeting of the Southeastern
Association of Game and Fish Corrunissioners, October 24-26, 1966, Ashville,
North Carolina).
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APPUCATION PROCEDURE

The procedure for acquiring a permit is deceptively simple.

KRS

151.150 requires that an application be submitted, (A copy of the application
is set out in the appendix),

The major emphasis in Ch. 151 is on accurate

reporting of data rather than adjudications of conflicts.

During the

first year after KRS Ch. 151 became effective about 600 permits were
issued which were numbered and coded by county and river basin and inserted
into a computer program,

The same is done with the required quarterly

withdrawal reports.
The procedure for obtaining a permit after an application is
filed is not clear.
prior to issuance,

The Division is not required to hold a hearing
In this respect Kentucky differs f:rom other states,

such as Iawa, which have modified the riparian system for they require
that the administering agency hold a hearing to determine if the permit should
94
be issued.
The Kentucky procedure is spelled out in KRS 151.170(2).
The Division is required to conduct an investigation to determine if the
quantity, time, place or rate of withdrawal will be detrimental to the
public interest or to the rights of other public users.

If it is found

that public and private rights will not be affected, the permit must be
issued.

The use of the word "shall" indicates that if the Division makes

these two findings but refused to issue a permit a writ of lll3l1damus
for its issuance could be obtained.

The last sentence of the subsection

provides "No permit shall be denied to a responsible applicant who has

94
System.

See Hines, A Decade of Experience Under the Iowa Water Permit
7 Natural Resources J. 499, 514-15 (1967),
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established an amount of water for which he has a need for a useful
purpose, provided the requested amount of water is available. "

intent of this sentence and its relation to the preceding one specifying
the findings the Division !IDlSt make is unclear.

I

It was probably intended

to allay the fears of existing users that the new scheme would take away
existing rights.

However, the sentence introduces two new terms

"responsible applicant" and "useful purpose" which are capable of administration determination.

Thus, the sentence actually gives the Division

broad powers over the issuance of a permit because it may investigate the
financial responsibility of a proposed applicant and the economic utility
of the proposed use. It is conceivable that the division could find that
water is available and other rights would not be adversely affected but
still refuse to issue a permit because they do not deem the applicant
"responsible" or the proposed use "useful."

I:

The

The applicant would have a

right to judicial review of these determinations but could not obtain a
writ of mandalffils because of the descretionary nature of the division's
function.
POWER OF DIVISION OF WATER TO AILOCATE DURING PERIODS OF SHORTAGE
KRS 151.200 authorizes the division to make temporary allocations
am:,ng pernri.t holders "in times of drought, emergency or other similar

!.
L
L
L
L

situations requiring the balancing of rights and available water am:,ng
users."

This meth::ld of administrative allocation is not found in either

the common law of riparian rights or the doctrine of prior appropriation
as it developed in the far west.

It is analogous to the powers given to

public officials during the first settlement of the Far West before the
- 59 -

development of a coherent body of water law doctrines.

When the l-brnons

reached Utah in 1847 they were not burdened by any rigid notions of the
righteousness of the free enterprise system.

Water was considered the

property of the state (it should be emphasized that it was the property
of the state and not the public) and county courts were given the power
to allocate water "as in their judgment shall best ••• subserve the
1nterests of settlement 1n the distribution o f water for irrigation. "95
96
Wyoming passed a statute ve:ry similar to this in 1876.
According to
•

•

'

0

•

O

•

'

one of the leading legal historians of the development of western water
law, the doctrine of prior appropriation replaced these early attempts at
administrative allocation of water after lawyers began to be alarmed at
the power which became concentrated in the state--plus the fact that the
administrative allocation was labeled french and italian and thus per se
97
inferior.
Section 200 simultaneously rejects the doctrine of prior appropriation and substitutes a new standard for apportionment for the concept
of reasonable use embodied in the c0111110n law of riparian rights.

Adminis-

trative allocation has been substituted for judicial adjudication of rights.
However, in practice the division will probably undertake the same kinds
of inquiries as have the courts in determining whether a proposed use is
reasonable and in adjudicating correlative rights.

The unfortunate aspect

95

No citation is available. The statute is quoted and discussed in
Lasky, Fran Prior Appropriation to Economic Distribution of Water by
the State Via Irrigation Administration, 1 Rock Mt. L. Rev. 161, 167 (1929).
96 Cornbined Laws of Wyo. of 1876, ch. 65, Sec. 4.
97 Lasky, supra, note 95 168-170.
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of Section 200 is that it incorporates into the permit system all the
undesirable features of the riparian system.

to the amount to which a riparian will be entitled in times of scarcity
is carried over into the permit system.

[

The same uncertainty as

Thus, nothing appears to have

been gained by Section 200.
The section, in this author's opinion, confuses the role of
administrative allocation in a free rrarket system for water rights.

The

goal of a water law system should be to encourage users to put water to
its optimum use consistent with the public interest.

This can be achieved

through a system of administrative allocation which hears applications for
a permit by h::llding a hearing to determine if a permit should be issued.
The purpose of the hearing is to define the relationship between the proposed use and the public interest 97 ~ The administrative agency should
make the following inquiries to determine whether the permit should be
issued:

(1)

Is the proposed use efficient or will another proposed use

serve the same users more efficiently?

For example, i f a city and water

district are in competition to serve a fringe area of the city, it would
be proper for the division to determine which of the

tW'.l

uses will result

in the vast expensive distribution of water, (2) Will the proposed use
affect the reservation of water for public uses such as recreation which
will be allocated by the existing rrarket system of water rights.

I.
I.
L

L
L

(3)

Should

the water be presently developed or reserved for future public or private
uses?

(4)

Will the proposed use shift external costs to other users and

members of the public when these costs should properly be J::orne by the
97a
This model is taken from Trelease, Policies for Water law: Property Rights, Economic Forces, and Public Regulation, 5 Natural Resources
J. 1 (1965). The concepts are fully discussed in the article.
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the permit holder>?

I

If the administrative agency concludes that the proposed use is
consistent with the above criteria a permit should be issued.

The permit

received should be capable of being used like any other> species of proper>ty
such as land.

It should be definite in arrount, time and place as provided

in KRS 151.170(2).

But, it should also allow the holder to rely on the

existence of a firm supply in times of scarcity.

This does not mean that

he should be able to rely on the perpetual existence of the arrount and
conditions contained in the permit but it .<:ices mean that he should be able
to calculate the arrount of curtailment he must suffer and either adjust
his activity accordingly or proceed through the ffi3.J'.'ket to acquire other
permit holder>' s rights as insurance.

This can be done t= ways"

( 1)

either>

the prior appropriation system can be adopted as it has been in Mississippi,
or (2) some sort of correlative rights system can be formulated similar
to doctrine of mutual prescription developed by the California Supreme
Court in the ground water> cases (discussed earlier>) where each user> knows

the percentage of the curtailment he must bear.

Either one of these t=

systems combined with the previously discussed public criteria for allocation would produce a ffi3.J'.'ket system which will encourage optimum uses
consistent with the public interest.

'The Kentucky permit system as

embodied in KRS 151. 200 in theory will not accomplish this.

This is

irrelevant as long as there are no conflicts arrong users rut could impede
the efficient distribution of water when they begin to occur.
A related defect in Chapter 151 is its failure to specify the
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duration of the permit. 98

KRS 151.170(1) provides such permits represent

a limited right of use and do not vest ownership nor an absolute right
to withdraw or use the water."

It vDuld be preferable if the permit

holder were given a right in perpetuity to use the water subject to its
being extinguished under the following t= conditions: (1) the use
99
of the water has been abandoned,
or (2) the division finds under KRS
151.170(4) that the permit holder is using substantially less than the
permit amount.

'Ihis last section gives the state ample powers to eliminate

wasteful uses of water and the broad language of subsection (1) is not
needed.

If the duration of the right is specified the ITBrket can then

operate to shift uses as new demands arise or the state can.use its power
to condemn the right if it decides the water should be put to different use.
Chapter 151 contains no provision making the permit appurtenant
to the land of the holder.

Thus, it rray be transferred without a sirnul-

taneous transfer of sone interest in the property.

The absence of an

appurtenancy requirement will rrake water rights rrore freely aleinable than
under the riparian system where the person desiring water had also to
bear the cost of purchasing riparian land.
One of the obvious objectives of KRS 151.200(1) was to provide a

L

method for apportioning municipal water supplies during short run drDughts.

[

water supplies have been a legislative grant of the power of eminent dorrain

L

L
L
L

The traditional methods of insuring the continued availability of municipal

98 See Trelease, supra at note 97 at 23-26.
99
See Yentzer v. Hemenway, 440 P.2d 7 (Wyo. 1968). The state has the
power to cancel a permit in whole or in part depending on the extent of
the abandonment.
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or a prefenmce.

If a municipality is given the power of eminent dana.in,

those persons who claim interfenmce with their rights are restricted to
an action for darrages and can not obtain injunctive relief.

If the city

is given a true prefenmce, other non-preferred users l!lllst curtail their
use in order to supply their wants.

It is too early to ascertain the

effectiveness of Section 200(1) and thus a detailed evaluation will not
be attempted at this time.
TRANSBASIN DIVERSIONS
KRS 151.200(2) which provides that the division may authorize the
transfer of diversion of public water from one watershed to another
"where such transfer is consistent with the wise use of public water of
the Corrrnonwealth and is in the best interests of the public," abolishes
the watershed limitation in the corrmon law riparian system.

The limi-

tation's rationale, set out in the leading Massachusetts case of Stratton
100
v. fuunt Hermon Boys School,
was that a trans-watershed diversion would
decrease the amount of return flow available to downstream users and
thus upset the hydrologic cycle.

The limitation has never been an absolute

barrier to trans-watershed diversions for an injunction will not be
granted if the proposed diversion were reasonable and riparians within
101
the watershed could show no present need for the water.
The doctrine
has been criticized because it can lead to the waste for resources, if
rigidly applied, because it may deny needed present uses to reserve the

l00216 Mass. 83, 103 N.E. 87 (1913). Stratton recognized that
injury lllllSt be shown before an injunction could be granted.
101-See, e.g., Texas Co. v. Burkett, 177 Tex. 16, 297 S.W. 273 (1927).
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water for future uses which may never materialize.

Section 151.200(2)

could be interpreted merely to codify the generally accepted comnon
law exception discussed atove to the doctrine, but its language indicates
that its intended scope was broader.
Section 200(2) should be interpreted to give the division the power
to use the perlllit system to implement basin and state-wide water plans.
Basin and state-wide water plans require a carrprehensive analysis of
the relationships between uses within and without the basin.

It must

also consider factors such as the impact of the proposed diversion of

r
r
[:
r:
[

[
[

!.
L

L
L
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the public interest in recreation and fish and wildlife preservation.
Of the llBl1Y factors which must be taken into account by the division, one
of the rrost important is the present and future needs of the area of origin
of the water.

These areas, 102 such as Eastern Kentucky, often have large

surpluses of water but often argue that water should not be transferred
outside the area because it must be reserved for future and undeterlllined
demands.

The division must consider long and short run demands such as this in
103
deterlllining whether to grant or issue a permit for a trans-watershed diversion.

102

For a discussion of legislative protection of areas of origin
see Johnson and Knippa, Transbasin Diversion of Water, 113 Texas L. Rev.
1035 (1965).
103 Vested riparian
.
.
.
. .
d by a trans-watershed
rights
can not be inJure
diversion, although they may be condemned for use outside the watershed.
For a statute authorizing condemnation if consistent with certain criteria
see N. C. Gen. Stat. §162A-7(c) (19611).
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'Ibe imp:irtance of Section 200(2) is that now the state is not bound by
non-functional classifications such as the watershed of origin but
may issue or deny permits based on their relationship to basin and
l
104
state-wi•cte water pans.

104 see Ref. 102 at 1057-1061. 'Ibe authors approve a statute such as
KRS 151.200(2) if it is used to grant or deny permits in conjunction with
a state-wide water plan.
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Chapter VII
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REGULATION OF DAM CONSTRUCI'ION
The new legislation gives the Division of Water new powers to
coordinate the construction of dams and other structural improvements.
KRS 151.250 requires that any private person or organization and all
public entities except the State Highway Department desiring to construct,
reconstruct, relocate, or improve "any dam, ernb3nl<ment, levee, dike bridge,
fill or other obstruction . . . across or any stream . . . . " IlnlSt obtain
a pennit from the Division.

The only requirement ~sed by ch. 151

is that the application contain the plans and specifications for the

[

r

proposed structure but the Division may issue regulations for the
issuance of permits and the application procedure.

The plans and speci-

fications IlnlSt be drawn by a professional engineer licensed under,J<RS
Ch. 322.

The Division has the power to exempt structures from the permit

requirement by regulation if they decide that a permit is not necessary
"in the interest of safety or the retention of water supply."

If these

regulations are enacted, relief for small farmers who desire to build
small ponds or engage in minor fill work can be implemented without
105
sacrificing the objectives of the statute.
The Division has twenty (2) working days after receipt of the plans

L
L
L

to reach a decision and notify the applicant if a permit will be granted
105

For a discussion of depth, area, height and other exemptions
Water
Laws and Legal Principals Affecting the Use of Water in Maryland 65-66 (1965).
from a similar Maryland statute see Galbreath, Maryland Water Law:
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or denie

The Division has the power to grant a permit subject
107
. to the acceptance of m:idifications.
KRS 151. 25 0 appears to incorporate
two standards to guide the Division in making their decision.

is safety.

The first

This is obvious and should cause little controversy.

The

second is "retention of water supply" and the general standard of beneficial use.

Section 250(3) specif.ies that "Nothing in this section is

intended to give the Division any jurisdiction or control over the
construction, reconstruction, improvement, enlargement, maintenance ..
or operation of any drainage district, ditch, or system established for
agricultural purpose, or to require the same when such obstruction of the
stream or floodway is determined by the division to be a detriment to
or hindrance to the beneficial use of water resources in the area ••

11108

106The statute does not speci"fy i f f ai·1ure to approve wit
. hin twenty
( 20) working days will result in automatic approval for the applicant.
Similar language in subdivision enabling legislation which requires that
the administrative agency has an affirmative duty to disapprove within the
statutory period or the permit will be considered. See, e.g., KRS 100.183 (1966).
7
l0 KRS 151.260(2) (1966).
108A frequent source of litigation between riparians is over damage caused
by obstructions placed in the stream which cause water to back up or flood onto
the land of others. A riparian is liable if he causes damage to another riparian
by an unreasonable obstruction. Crabtree Coal Mining Co. v. Bamby's Adm'r 183 Ky.
647, 90 S.W. 226 (1906). KRS 151.250 (2) (1966) is an attempt to minimize litigation by forcing the applicant to consider the potential damage his obstructions
might cause in advance and to take the necessary steps to eliminate it so that
there will be no need for litigation after the fill has been completed. 250(2)
p:rovides: No person, city, county or other political subdivision of the state
shall commence the filling of any area with earth, debris, or any other material,
or raise the level of any area in any manner, or place a building, barrier or
obstruction of any sort on any area located adjacent to a river or stream so
that such filling, raising or obstruction will in any way affect the flow of
water in the channel or in the floodway of the stream unless plans and specifications for such work have been subnitted to and approved by the division arid a
permit issued as required in subsection (1) above. KRS 151. 310 (1966) prohibits
non-fill deposits which "will in any way restrict or disturb the flow of water
in the channel or in the floodway of any stream except where a permit has
been issued •..under KRS 151. 250 ••• " Encroachments on federal and state dams
are also prohibited.
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This section was probably intended to allay the fears of farmers and
other agricultural interests against the spector of state control but
it is difficult to gage its impact on permit applications.

l
r:

definition incorporated into the policy statement and by implication

r:

beneficial use is a one dimensional standard for it merely defines broad

['

the use fits within one of the broad categories, the permit should be

This definition of beneficial use appears to be different than the

into the standards for granting a use permit.

categories of socially desirable uses.

granted.

l

In this latter context

If the water is available and

The definition in !<RS 151.250 combined with the :implication

in 250(1) that the Division is to consider the impact of the project of
the state's water supply appears to be more like the requirement in planning

[

and zoning enabling legislation that the ordinance be in accordance with

(

_

the comprehensive plan.

Section 250(3) contemplates the eventual existence

of state-wide and watershed development plans which should give the division

[

and the courts objective criteria to determine if a proposed structure is
consistent with the coordinated, develoµnent of the area's water resources.
Presumably if the Division finds that the proposed facility duplicates

!
(

l
L
L
L
L

existing facilities or that any other proposed system of structures has a
lower cost-benefit ratio, the permit could be denied under 250(3).
!<RS 151.270 preserves a right of judicial review for any person

who wishes to contest Division denial or modification of a permit.

The

applicant has sixty days to file an appeal from a division order in the
circuit court.

The proper circuit court is not specified but presumably

the legislature intended the same rights to be conferred on parties
contesting denial of a structure permit as those contesting a use
- 69 -

pennit so the circuit court of the county in which the applicant resides
w::,uld be the proper forum.

The case will be heard without a jury and the

proponent of the project has the burden of proof,
.
.
109
appeal to the Court of Appeals is provided.

The usual right of

If a person starts construction without a pennit he is liable to
a maximum fine of one thousand (1,000.00) dollars for each separate day
that the offense continues. 110

r

In addition to being liable to a fine,

he may enjoined fran further w::>rk on the project. The pennit holder may
not deviate fran the approved plans without the pennission of the Division,
'Ihe statute defines an offense in addition to starting construction without
11111
a pennit as "Any substantial deviation from approved plans , , .

l

r

The Division has the authority to periodically inspect any structure
which restricts the flow of water in a stream. 112

If structural defects which co~

cause personal injury or property damage are discovered, the Division may
schedule a hearing to detennine what corrective measures must be taken,113
After the hearing an order to make the necessary repairs may be issued.
The failure to comply with a remedial order is a violation under KRS
151.990. 114 The pennit holder may appeal to the circuit court and eventually
to the Court of Appeals.
If any structure is found to be a "serious threat" to life or property,
the Division shall direct the Attorney General to secure a mandatory injunction
against the owner for the correction or removal of the structure. 115
l0 9KRS 151.280(1) (1966).
llOKRS 151.990 (1966).
lllKRS 151.280(2) (1966).
112KRS 151,290(1) (1966).
113KRS 151.290(2) (1966).
114KRS 151.290(3) (1966).
115KRS 151,290(4) (1966).

KRS 151.460 (1966).
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Chapter VIII

PROCEDURAL RIGHTS OF APPLICANTS AND THIRD PARTIES
A RIGHT TO HEARING
'Ihe Kentucky statutory scheme differs from those enacted in other
states such as Iowa because a hearing is not required prior to the issuance
of a permit.

'Ihe director of the division has the authority to make

three choices when he receives an application for a permit.

He may issue

it for the amount requested, he may issue it for less than the amount
requested.

It is found that a reduction would "be in the best interests
11116
of the public or other water users,
and he may deny it if it is found

L
i:
I
I

· ·
. not avail
. ab le. 117
that sufficient
water f or the proposed use is

In addition

the permit may subsequently be amended if it is found that the user is using
less than the granted amount.
'Ihe division merely notifies the applicant if the permit has been
.
.
h e requested amount. ll8
issued
int

If it intends to mxlify or deny, the

division must notify the applicant and give him the opportunity to appear
before the division.

If the division still m:xlifies or denies the permit,

the applicant may appeal to the circuit court of the county in whieh

I
L
L
L
L

he resides

within thirty

(30) days after issuance of a

116KRS 151.170(1) (1966).
117KRS 151.170(2) (1966).
118 Ibid.
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division,

order.

119

This procedure for a hearing before the division guarantees

the rights of applicants to procedural due process and thus is not subject
to constitutional defects.
The rights of third parties are not similarly protected.

This

would not be a serious defect if the purpose of the permit system is
confined to information gathering but it is if used for regulatory purposes,
and third party rights to the use of public water are adversely affected.
The legislature contemplated that third party rights are a relevant
factor for the division to consider in permit applications.
thus becomes:

The question

do third parties have sufficient rights to entitle them to

legal protection if they desire to contest the issuance of a permit?
The question requires a determination of whether third parties have
,
.
. a division
. . .
a substantial
interest
in
order. 120 I twould seem that they
clearly do since KRS 151.170 makes it theoretically possible for the
division to issue a permit which might reduce the amount of water to which
they might be entitled had they appeared before the division.

However,

119KRS 151. 180 provides: Notice and hearing before denial of permit;
appeals. Prior to the denial of an application for a water withdrawal
permit or the issuance of a permit for amounts less than the applicant
applied for, the person, business, industry, city, county, water district
or other political subdivision aggrieved thereby, shall be notified by the
division and given an opportunity to appear before the division and be
heard. Within thirty days of an order of the division denying a permit,
or an order issuing a permit in amounts less than those applied for, the
aggrieved person may appeal the order of the division to the circuit
court of the county in which the applicant resides as provided in KRS
151.190 (1966, c. 23,
22).
120
For a discussion of third party rights to appeal administrative
orders, see Oberst, Parties to .Administrative Hearings, 40 Mich. L. Rev.
578, 402-404, and Hines, supra note 53-61.
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the Court of Appeals could find that thiru parties are not adversely
affected by division oruers because a permit lacks finality since they
are entitled to appeal to the circuit court under KRS 151.190 which
preserves a right of judicial review to any party aggrieved by a corrmission

r

oruer.

Thus, it is probable that the Court of Appeals would find that

a division oruer is not final because the issue of thiru party rights
can be litigated by a court and are not settled by division action.
There is another procedural right involved which may be controlling
in deciding i f the thiru party provisions are free frum constitutional
defect.

Thiru parties have a constitutional right to adequate notice

of pending proceedings affecting their interests in oruer to protect
their right to due process.

I:

KRS 151.180 requires that notice of an

adverse oruer be given only to aggrieved applicants.
exists for thiru parties.

No similar duty

Thus, under KRS ch. 151 the thiru party

has no method of ascertaining the existence of the issuance of a permit
which might be adverse to his interests except by chance.
The constitutional standaru of a person's right to notice of proceedings which may affect his interests is :

"The reasonableness and

hence the constitutional validity of any chosen method may be defended

I
I

on the ground that it is on itself reasonably certain to inform those
affected , .• or, where conditions so not substantially permit such
notice, that the form chosen is not substantially less likely to bring
121
home notice other than feasible and customary substitutes."
Because

I_

L
L
L

121
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 365
(1950). See also Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962).
(procedure for condemnation of riparian rights which provided for notice
by posted handbills rather than a letter held unconstitutional).
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I
KRS ch. 151 provides no requirement that third parties be notified of a
pending permit application or that a permit has been issued, I conclude
that the rights of third parties have not been given the required constitutional protection.

Thus, a permit should be subject to collateral attack

by a third party who considers his rights affected by the issuance of
a permit.
A 1956 Kansas federal district court decision might indicate,
however, that KRS ch. 151 is not constitutionally defective because it
does not provide for notice to third parties whose rights might be affected
122
it was argued that the
by issuance of a permit. In Baumann v. Smrha
Kansas appropriation statute was unconstitutional because it did not give
third parties notice of a permit hearing.

The statute provided that all

permits would be issued subject to vested rights and the court held that
since vested rights must be protected, by definition a third party could
not be injured by the issuance of a permit.

KRS 151.170(2) does not

expressly require protection of vested rights (the problem of protection of
vested riparian rights is discussed in the next section) and thus it does
not appear that the rationale of Baumann can be applied to KRS ch. 151.
In addition the court's reasoning ignores the problem of effective pro-

tection to third parties.

The requirement that vested rights be protected

should not be equated with a third party's rights to notice.

The former

requirement saves the statute from being held an unconstitutional taking
but it does not insure a procedure for protection of third party's right

122145 F. Supp. 617 (D, Kan. 1956 ). For a discussion of the kind of
notice which would meet constitutional standards see Hines supra at 57-60.
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to due prucess.

In order that these rights be effectively preserved a

court should h::ild that third parties were entitled both to prutection of
existing rights from elimination by administrative action and to notice
when these rights might be affected.

n
[
1·

RIGHT TO APPEAL
The requirement that applicants

and third parties IIU.lst wait until

entry of a final order before appealing to the circuit court is a codification of the rule that a litigant IIU.lst exhaust his administrative
remedies before appealing to the courts,

[

L
[

to this which are recognized in Kentucky,

There are several objections
The applicant need not exhaust

his administrative remedies i f he wishes to attach the constitutionality
of the statute or the pruvision being applied to him.

The applicant also

need not exhaust if he can show that exhaustion would be futile, or if
he can show that the policy of the administrative agency is fixed and will

1·

I

not vary in subsequent administrative actions.
The statute does not specify any standards for judicial review
other than the substantial evidence test.

It will prubably be assumed

by the Court of Appeals that the statute incorporates other generally
accepted standards such as

I
I
L
L
L
L

(1)

action in excess of granted powers and

lack of procedural due prucess . The Court of Appeals in American
123
reviewed the numeruus standards of judicial review
Beauty Homes
( 2)

adopted at various times by the General Assembly and concluded that all
verbal formulations could be reduced to a single standard:

123
379 S.W.2d 450 (Ky. 1964).
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'Ihe uncorrelated legislative attempts to designate
specific considerations controlling the scope of judicial
review are aimed in the proper general direction, but the
fact of the rratter is that they have not rraterially affected
or changed the pattern of review. 'Ihis is so because the
scope of review is basically founded upon the independent
exercise of judicial power, and limitations irrposed by the
legislature will not prevail if they fail to protect the
legal rights of a complaining party. As we have heretofore
indicated, the courts can and will safeguard those rights
when questions of law properly present the ultirrate issue
124
of arbitrary action on the part of an administrative agency.
Standards of judicial review give the Court of Appeals a
deal of trouble.

great

'Ihis stems from the continued hostility of members

of the Kentucky bar to administrative agencies and a reliance on the
courts to decide all legal questions.

For a number of years applicants

aggrieved by an order of the Louisville and Jefferson County Planning
Commission were entitled to a trial de novo in the Jefferson
circuit court.

County

'Ihe court was free to make its own findings and substitute

them for those of the commission.

In 1964 the Court of Appeals held that

this procedure was unconstitutional because it resulted in a delegation
of legislative functions to judicial bodies.

In setting the standards

for judicial review KRS 151.190 attempts to steer a course between
delegating legislative functions to the courts and giving the courts
an active supervisory role over the work of the division.
KRS 151.190 provides:

IID.y person aggrieved by a.final order of the division rray
obtain a review of the order by filing in.the circuit court
of the county in which the applicant resides , within thirty

124
379 S. W. 2d 457 (Ky. 1964 )o
- 76 -

r

I

days after entry of the order, a written petition
praying that the order be m:x:lified or set aside in whole
or in part.

A copy of the petition shall be forthwith

served upon the division, and thereupon the division
shall certify and file in court a copy of the reccrd
before the division, including therein all pleadings,
orders, documentary exhibits,any stenographic transcript
of testirrony before the division.

When these have been

filed, the ccurt shall have exclusive jurisdiction
to affirm, IIDdify, enforce or set aside the order,
in whole or in part.

No objection to the order may

be considered by the ccurt unless it was urged before
the division or there was reasonable grounds for
failure to do so.

The findings of the division as

to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence,
are conclusive.

If either party applies to the court

for leave to adduce additional evidence, and shows to
the satisfaction of the ccurt that the additional

l

evidence is material and that there were reasonable
grounds for failure to adduce the evidence in the
hearing before the division, the ccurt may order the
additional evidence to be taken before the division in

L
L
L
L

such a manner and upon such condition as the court may
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consider proper.

The division may rrodify its findings

as to the facts, by reason of the additional evidence
so taken; and it shall file any rrodified or new findings
with the court, which if suppcrted by substantial evidence shall be conclusive, and may file any recomnendation for the rrodification or setting aside of the original
order.

The comnencement of proceedings under this

section does not, unless specifically ordered by the
court, operate as a stay of the division I s order.

Pm

appeal may be taken from the judgment of the circuit
court to the Court of Appeals on the same terms and conditions as an appeal is taken in any civil action.
(1966, c. 23,

§

23)

The first part of the section enacts the substantial evidence standard.

This is the traditional standard of judicial review and limits the court's
function to a determination of whether the division complied an adequate
factual basis for its conclusions.

The burden to prove that the findings

are not supported by substantial evidence is placed on the applicant.

The

court must still, however, determine whether the reasons given by the
conrrnission are conclusions of fact or law.

The formerare not reviewable

except under the standard discussed above while the latter are fully reviewable and the court is free to substitute the decision for the divisions.
This kind of determination could prove troublesane for the courts.
Many of the determinations the division is authorized make, such as
whether the propcsed use is for a "useful purpcse," call for value judgments rather than for scientific determinations which can be verified
- 78 -
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l

by objective criteria such as finding that a sufficient quantity of water
is or is not available to satisfy the anount requested in a permit.

It is

likely that courts will categorize determinations such as "useful purpose"
as questions of law and thus subject to review.

c
c
[

A good example of the

kind of categorizations the court will make is found in ~ of Covington
.
,
125
v. Board of Comnissioners of Kenton County Water District.
The district
filed an application for a certificate of public convenience to extend
its service which was denied by the Commission.

The reason given was

that it would result in a duplication of the cities facilities and thus
the proposed extension would be a wasteful allocation of water.

The trial

judge reversed this finding on the theory that a determination of wastefulness was one of law and thus he was entitled to make it.

[

He found that

the facilities would not be wasteful because they could serve the area at
a lower rate than could the city.

The Court of Appeals affirmed on the

broader ground that the commission's finding of duplication was unreasonable
because there was no assurance that the City's water supply would continue
to be available to the district.

This case illustrates the great flexi-

bility courts have in reviewing administrative determinations by their
ability to characterize questions as ones of law rather than fact.

A

court not wishing to review such a determination could conclude that these
were precisely the kinds of questions which call for great expertise and

l
L
L
L
L

were thus delegated to an administrative agency and invoke the substantial
evidence rule to affirm the agency ruling.

But, if the courts desire they

can take an active role in reviewing division determinations.

125 371 S.W.2d 20 (Ky. 1963).
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This is

further underscored by the court's power to hear additional evidence if the
applicant can prove that reasonable grou.,ds existed for failing to introduce the evidence in a hearing before the division.
Improper Delegation of Powers :
It may be argued that K.R.S. ch. 151 is unconstitutional because
it constitutes an improper delegation of legislative power to an administratfu: agency.

Prior to the New Deal many attempted regulatory schemes

were struck down on this ground, but the United States Supreme Court has
not used this ground as a means of invalidating federal regulatory schemes
since the New Deal.

While many state courts have used this theory to

bolster judicial hostility to administrative regulation, Kentucky is not
one of them and it is unlikely that ch. 151 will be found to be an improper
delegation of legislative powers to an administrative agency.
The general test for legislative delegations has tradiationally been
whether the administrative agency has been given sufficient standards
so that arbitrary actions can be curbed.

This test has given the courts

a great deal of trouble because in complex regulatory schemes the legislature is forced to define the agencies discretion in broad terms and
courts have upheld delegations saying that precise standards existed
when none in fact did.

A leading scholar of administrative law has long

argued that the court were incorrect in focusing on the problems of
standards and instead should focus on the adequacy of procedural due
process.

This view has been adopted by the Court of Appeals in Butler
126
v. United Cerebral Palsy of Northern Kentucky, Inc.
The court upheld
statute against a charge, am:mg other things, of unconstitutional

126

352 S.W.2d 203 (Ky. 1961).
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delegation which provided for public aid to private institutions which
educated "exceptional children,"

After noting "In its laconic simplicity

leaves much to be desired" and reviewing the doctrine of unconstitutional
delegation Judge Palnore upheld it after a candid explanation of the
delegation problem and its solution.
"In the study fran which we have quoted it is further demonstrated,
by numerous examples from this and other courts, that in order to find
the effective law "one must look past the theory to the holdings. The
correlation between the theory and the holdings is characteristically
low, and when it is high the holdings have been unfortunate when examined
in the light of practical needs of effective government. "

Let us,

then, examine this law in terms of the practical needs of effective
government, and in terms of safeguards against abuse and injustice.
The legislature wants to encourage and lend a modicum of support
to the special education of a certain class of people,
wish, in so doing, to waste the taxpayers I money.

It does not

The members of the

legislature are allowed to meet in regular session only 60 days every
two years.

They have neither the time, facilities , nor qualifications

to do more than indicate the class and fix the anount to be spent.

At

the state's disposal, however, is its board of education, an agency fully

[

L
L
L
L

and better qualified than the legislature to establish and carry out whatever further policies and procedures lll3.Y be necessary or desirable.
This body also is one of the most responsible and long-established agencies
of the state government.

Is there any real danger that it would, even if

it could, abuse the responsibilities conferred upon it by this act?
think not.

Moreover, since arbitrary power does not exist in this
- 81 -

We

Comnonwealth, any discriminatory treatment is inherently reviewable by
the courts,

Cf. 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure

164, pp. 506-507; Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, 28.21, Vol. 4,
11 127
pp. 112-113.
§

The same reasoning applies to K.R.S. Ch. 151.
procedural defects has been discussed previously.

The existence of
It is possible that

the court: might find certain sections of the statute unconstitutional for
these reasons but it is unlikely that they would find the statute to be
unconstitutional because it results in an attempted delegation of legislative functions without sufficient standards.

The standards contained

in K.R.S. ch. 151 are much more precise than those upheld in Butler

and could be found constitutional even under a rrore tradiational analysis
than the one adopted in that case.

127 Id. at 208.
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Chapter IX
CONSTITlITIONALITY OF CHAPI'ER 151
KRS Ch. 151 presents important constitutional problems.

The

state rray regulate the use of water to further public objectives pursuant to
its police power within the limits imposed by the federal and state consti128 The lll3.JOr
.
'
tutions.
cons t'tut'
i
ionall'lJ1lJ.'ta t'ions are the due process and
equal protection clauses of the fifth amendment, which is applicable to the
state's through the fourteenth, prohibits the "taking" of private property

[r

by a unit of government without the payment of just compensation.

Doc-

trinal formulations of state authority and its limitations such as "police

[

r-

!.

power," "private property," and "taking" have no inherent meaning except
as they are applied to specific situations for their inherent vagueness
makes it impossible to formulate definitions of uniform applicability.
Much government action in some = e r affects the use and therefore the
value of private property.

Sanetirnes the value of property is decreased

as in the case of a denial of request for rezoning from residential to
ccmnercial.

Othertimes the individual is benefited by government action

as in the case of an upland owner whose property value is increased because

I
L
L
L

L

development in the flood plain beneath his land is restricted thus limiting
the amount of land available for development.

Economists and other social

scientists have no way of defining with precision all of the costs and

128see King, Regulation of Water Rights under the Police Power,
Water Resources and the I.aw 271 (1958).
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benefits of a given governmental decision and the law has required no
. .
129
'Ihe due prucess and equal protection clauses thus
sueh precision.
do not prohibit all governmental regulation which decreases the value of
private property but only if it results in the "taking" of "property".
'Ihe terms are conclusionary labels and provide few criteria to detennine
if a given regulation is valid or invalid for they are often pinned-on
to justify a decision 1113.de on a nore elaborate but imprecise rationale.
'Ihe courts rrake two kinds of inquiries in deciding the constitutionality of regulatory schemes such as Ch. 151.
deals with the purpose of the regulation.

'Ihe first inquiry

'Ihe second focuses on the

impact of the regulation on the individual property owner.

Courts often

speak of balancing or weighting the purpose with its impact on the

individual but this formulation of the constitutional standard obscures
the hard value choices the court is iiaking for the
inconsistent.

two

approaches are

'Ihe nost praiseworthy of objectives--such as the construe-

tion of a flood control reservoir--may financially ruin an individual.
No one would suggest that an individual farmer should gratuitously cede
his land to the federal government for a flood control reservoir on the
rationale that the benefits to society outweigh his individual loss.
Yet, this same rationale is often used to support government regulations

129'Ihe cases sustaining
· ·
· · or
t he use of t he po1·ice power to lJJn1t
even prohibit the extraction of natural resources graphically illustrate
the breadth of the power.
See e.g., Blancett v. llintgom';!'Y, 398 S.W.2d
877 (Ky. 1965) (City 1113.y prohibit the extraction of oil within its corporate limits); Consolidated Rock Products v. Ci of Los
eles, 57 Cal.
2.d 515 370 P.2d 342 Calif. 1962 appeal diS!lllssed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962)h
(prohibition of quarrying operation to protect quality of air in city
which advertised itself as a health center) See generally Sax, Takings and
the Police Power 7, Yale L.J. 36 (1964).
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which severely decrease the value of one individual's property.

The

courts have evolved no consistent standards to enable lawyers to prediet whether a given regulation will be found a valid police power
regulation or an invalid taking and at best the cases suggest some

r
I:

rough guidelines and the doctrinal formulations scholars have suggested
prove difficult to apply in hard cases.
The first line of inquiry pursued by the courts is the purpose
of the regulation.

The courts require that the government dem:mstrate

a nexus between the regulation and the public welfare.

This is generally

not a difficult burden and often a court will look no further than the
recitals of purpose in the act.

The court does not require a showing

that some quantifiable benefits to the public will occur.

It requires

only that there is a legitimate public purpose behind the regulatory

L

scheme and that the methods chosen are reasonable methods of achieving
its objective.

Once this is established the burden of proof shifts
to the party attempting to invalidate the regulation. 130 This is a
difficult burden to meet for it must be shown that statute is clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable, has no substantial relation to the public

I
I
L
L

L
L
L

health, safety, morals, or general welfare.
There is no doubt as to the legitimacy of the purpose of Ch. 151.
Regulation of the development of natural resources has been a historic
concern and function of government,

Water is a resource which is

130williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955). The Kentucky
Court of Appeals has adopted the same presumption of constitutionality
and standards of judicial review. See e.g., Fried v. Louisville and
Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Commission, 258 S.W. 2d 466 (1953),
and City of Richlawn v. Mahon, 313 Ky. 265, 230 S.W.2d 902 (1950).
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essential to the continued vitality of the state's economy for supply
will remain relatively constant but use demands will intensify as the
population increases. 131 The failure to make an efficient allocation of
this resource could result in !113.jor economic disruptions in the long run
to the ultilll3.te detriment of substantial numbers of the state's citizens.
The need for comprehensive water resources planning and regulation can
be expanded at great length but it is now generally well accepted and
it is inconceivable to think that the Court of Appeals w::iuld not find
the objective legitilll3.te.
The question which can not be answered with any certainty is once
having found the objective legitilll3.te, will the Court of Appeals find ch.
151 constitutional?

The legitilll3.cy of the objective should not obscure

the court f:rom making an inquiry into the :impact of the statute on existing
uses of water.

This first requires a determination of what rights were

"vested" prior to the enactment of Ch. 151 and whether they have been
"taken".

The courts which have considered similar schemes have generally

held that they are constitutional as long as vested rights have not been
.
132
:impaired.
The statute makes no attempt to create a category of prior rights

which are vested.

It is not fully clear if the state is now the source

131The importance of state-wide water planning for recreation
was recognized by the Court of Appeals in Ccmnonwealth of Kentucky,
Department of Highways v. Thomas (Opinion unpublished as of date of
writing. Decision rendered December 15, 1967).
132 See e.g., State ex rel. Elnery v. Knapp, 167 Kan. 546, 20 P.2d
440 (1945) (Kansas Act changing f:rom riparian to appropriation system
held constitutional).

l
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of rights or if riparian rights will continue to control the allocation
of water.

As has been discussed earlier, this monograph is assuming

that new rights will be neither appropriative or riparian but will be
state created [Underlining added].

On this assumption the most important

question are whether present consumptive rights will be impaired and
whether unused riparian rights will be held to be vested.

and writers have assumed that the natural flow theory or the reasonable
use theory required that all rights, consumptive and unused, would be
vested and thus could not be subject to state regulation unless the
riparian was compensated for their impairment.

[

l

It is clear, however,

that state legislatures are not subject to such rigid limitations.
The determination of what rights are "vested" and which are not
can not be 1!13.de by any precise formula.

L

Earlier courts

"Vested" can be most accurately

described as a conclusionary label applied by the courts after they
had decided that the state should not be able to interfere with the
individual's use of the resource without paying compensation to him.

hi

analysis of the decisions which have considered the question reveals
that sweeping statements such as one 1!13.de in a study prepared by the
Kentucky Legislative Research Commission that "The general rule is that
riparian rights since they are vested property rights, cannot be taken
or terminated by the state without compensation to the owners'' is so

l
L
L
L
L

broad as to be meaningless.

Some forms of riparian uses have traditionally

been subject to police power regulation and thus the state has not had
to compensate when they were impaired.

For example, sane courts have

upheld the right of the state or city to prohibit bathing and swinming
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in a lake in order to protect the purity of a municipal water supply.

133

The right to bathe, swim, and fish are recognized riparian rights but
so classifying them does not inrnunize them fran state regulation.
KRS 151.120 declares IIR.lch of the water in the Comnonwealth to
be public.

The purpose of the section is to create a firm theoretical

basis of state exercise of the police power.

The declaration that

water is public has historically served as a basis for state regulation.
134
In a recent case the Minnesota Supreme Court State v. Kulvar
sustained
a statute similar to Kentucky's which declared IInlCh of the water of state
public and created a permit system.

The court said that the statute

was justified because:
"It is fundamental that, in this state and elsewhere,
that the state in its sovereign capacity possesses a proprietary interest in the public waters of the state.

Riparian

Rights are subordinate to the rights of the public and subject to reasonable control and regulation by the state. 135
The foundation of rrodern assertions that water is public water stems
from Roman law.

The Romans conceptualized natural resources such as

air and water as part of a negative ccmnunity-res communes-with

133 state v. Heller, 123 Conn. 492, 196 Atl. 337 (1937) appeal
dismissed 303 U.S. 627 (1937) (prohibition not held a taking). Compare
Bino v. City of Hurley, 273 Wis. 10, 76 N.W.2d 571 (1956) (prohibition
of swiJiming held a taking). The cases are collected and extensively
analyzed in Lauer, The Riparian Right as Property, Water Resources and
the law 133 (1958).
134
266 Minn. 408, 123 N.W.2d 699 (1963).
135123 N.W.2d at 706-7.
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the consequence that they were the property of everyone until reduced
.
by an i.nd ivi"dua.
1 136 The English adopted the Roman view
to possession
0

calling water publi juris until reduced to possession.

The Roman theory

of the negative community does not logically imply that the state has

r

the power to regulate water but it has been adapted for that purpose.
The state adopted the theory that while the waters are "owned" by the

entire citizenry they are also held in trust by the state for the general
public.

State declarations of trusteeship were initially confined to

navigable waters in order to protect rights such as the right of the
general public to fish in a navigable stream.

However, the western

states have used the trust theory to support comprehensive regulatory

r:
L

r
[

schemes over all of the water within its boundaries and presumably the
·
.
137
same option--as Kentucky has taken--is open to the Eastern states.
There is much confusion in the trust analogy and references to handy Latin
phrases such as res cornrrrunes or the hypnotic publi juris.

It would

be rrnre candid for the courts to rest a regulatory scheme as Chapter 151
on the state's general police power subject to the traditional contributional limitations.

Kulvar, however, is an example of the use of the trust

theory to sustain a use regulation statute and should be followed by the
Court of Appeals.

Validation of the regulatory scheme does not, however,

dispose of the question of whether "vested rights" are entitled to

L
L
L
L.

L

136ror a historical discussion of the development of Roman and
English Comrron law see 1 Wiel, Water Rights in the Western States,
2-13 (3rd ed. 1911).
137 For a rrnre detailed explanation of this position see '!'release,
Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 145 Calif. L. Rev. 638
(1957).
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protection.

The Court of Appeals could hold that a regulatory scheme

was constitutional as an exercise of the police power but find Chapter
151 unconstitutional because it fails to protect vested rights.

The

concept of "vested rights" is generally used to protect individuals who
would be hurt by a new application of the law because they were induced
to rely on the continued existence of the previous law.

A frequently

litigated problem which requires a determination of whether a right is
vested is a person whose property is unzoned at the time he starts construction of a building but it is subsequently zoned to exclude the
contemplated use.

The court must determine if he has a vested right to

a nonconforming use.

To decide this it generally inquires into the extent

to which he would suffer financially if he were forced to cease construction
and whether his reliance was in good faith and thus. justified.

The

Court of Appeals could hold that only consumptive rights and not unused
riparian rights need be protected by analoging from two recent cases in
the law of future interests and zoning which have considered the problem
of protecting vested rights.
In 1960 Kentucky abolished the distinction between a right of re-entry
and a possibility of reverter.

A single future interest-a right of re-entry-

was created and their traditional exemption from the policy behind the
rule against perpetuities was abolished by limiting the right to re-enter
upon breach of a condition to a period not longer than thirty years after
their creation.

Interests created prior to 1960 were allowed to continue

in perpetuity if they were registered by 1965, otherwise they were to
terminate within 30 years after the date of their creation. 138 In

1388ee "-·'. .
. .
J.A.US.errunier,
Kentucky p erpetuities
law Restated and Reformed,
49 Ky. L,J, 1, 69-81 (1960) for a discussion of the act.
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Atkinson v. Kish,

139

the court had to construe a wil1 which contained a

restraint on alienation which in turn created a right of re-entry in the
heirs of the grantor.

The restraint had not been exercised within thirty

years after its creation nor had it been registered.

The court held it

was no longer enforceable and in so doing included a footnote which implied
that the 1960 statutory scheme was constitutional although the court's reasoning
was deceptively simple.

It held that the right of re-entry in the heirs

was not a vested right and thus not entitled to constitutional protection, 140

1-

This is a gross overstatement of the status of right of re-entry, and
belies the complexity of the problem.

What the court seems to be saying

is that holders of such rights are not entitled to rely on the continued

I:
L

existence of the right because the statute was enacted for a legitimate
purpose (elimination of clogs on titles) and provided notice that the
right would cease after a certain period unless certain reasonable steps

r

were taken to preserve it.

Since the holders had the opportunity to pre-

I
I

relied to their detrement hence the right is not "vested".
141
In Ashland Lumber Co. v. Williams,
a lumber canpany desired to

serve the right and failed to take it, it is unreasonable to conclude they

extend a non-conforming use.

They obtained an opinion from the building

inspector and city attorney that their expansion was permissible.

After

the buiiding was ninety percent completed neighbors brought a successful

L
L
L
L
L

action before the Board of Adjustment to cancel the permit.

The case

was appealed to the circuit court where the 11.Dilber company admitted that

139420 S.W.2d 104 (Ky. 1967)
140rd. at 109 note 5.
141Ashland Lumber Co. v. Williams 411 S.W.2d 909 (Ky. 1966).
- 91 -

its activity violated the zoning ordinance but held it had a vested
right to complete the expansion because they had relied to their detr:iment.
The court rejected this argument because the lumber company had relied
on the opinions of officials who did not have the authority to authorize
an expansion.

Ashland indicates that a finding of vested right is a

function of justified reliance on the continued existence of the right
and could be used to support an argument that Chapter 151 is constitutional
as long as prior consumptive rights are protected.
One of the major defects in Chapter 151 is its failure to specify
clearly the statutes of consumptive rights prior to July 1, 1967.

It is

unlikely that any prior uses will be terminated or diminished under the
statute but the possibility exists.

The only section which can be read

to protect prior rights is KRS 151.170(2) which requires the director
to determine if issuance of a permit will be detr:imental to the "rights
of other public water users".

If this section is construed to preclude

the extinguishment or diminishment of prior consumptive uses then the
statute should be held constitutional.

If it is not, the Court of Appeals

might find Chapter 151 unconstitutional in so far as it fails to protect
.
142
vested rights.
Kentucky would do well to amend Chapter 151 to grant express
protection to prior consumptive uses.

The best method of accomplishing

this consistent with the objectives of Chapter 151 would be to require
existing riparian users to quantify their rights within a given period.
Those who quantified their rights by registering with the division ~uld
receive a vested right while those who did not would lose their right.

142 see e.g., State ex rel. Einery v. Knapp, 167 l<an. 546, 20 P.2d
440 (1945).
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Oregon implemented a similar statute in 1909 and the State Supreme Court
held it constitutional. 143 If this decision is followed in Kentucky, only
prior consumptive uses need be accorded the status of vested rights,

This

procedure should give the Division the necessary flexibility it needs in
implementing a new system of water rights without harming prior users
who have come to rely on the availability of a fixed quantity of water.
The limitation of protection to prior consumptive uses will not make it

possible for prior users to assert paper rights to large quantities of
water so the broad policy objectives of Chapter 151 should not be impeded.

(

[

!
l
l
L
L
L
L

143 In Re Water Rights
.
.
of Hood River,
114 Ore. 112, 227 Pac. 1065
(1924). Mississippi contained a similar provision for protection of Riparian
when they changed to the prior appropriation system in 1956. Miss. Code
Ann. 5956-02(g)(2) (1956). See Champion, Prior Appropriation in Mississippi-A Statutory Analysis, 39.Miss. L. Rev. 1, 12-20 (1967).
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Chapter X

SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF RECREATION WITI:I EMPHASIS
ON THE NAVIGATION SERVITUDE
Kentucky has a great potential for recreation.

In fact, it could

be argued that its long run economic growth lies in transforming itself

r
I

into an agricultural and recreational reserve for the East and Midwest
as the state has a wide-variety of sources of water-based recreation from
free-flowing mountain streams to large lakes behind IID.llti-purpose
reservoirs.
The major legal problems in the recreational use of water will
center around the following questions:

(1)

can a permit be secured to

divert ar use water for recreational development, (2) can a state withdraw
water from development to preserve it for aesthetic and recreational
purposes? (3)

what rights does the public have to the use of public water

where the banks are in private ownership and what rights do individual
riparian and littoral owners have vis a vis one another?

( 4)

what public

contrDl will be maintained over shoreland developnent?
Chapter 151 does not contain a list of beneficial uses nor does it
contain a list of preferences to determine how water will be allocated
among various categories of users in time of scarcity.

KRS 151.100

does list the growing demand for water for recreational uses as a reason
for enactment of the statute.

It is thus probable that the court will

look to the comrron law - and perhaps the law of prior appropriation -

- 94 -

r

in determining if a pennit can be issued for recreational uses.

It is

necessary to distinguish between various kinds of recreation activities,
altmugh the law has not yet begun to make such distinctions.

It is

useful to distinguish between demands for general outdoor recreation and

r

.
.
unique
natural recreation
areas. 144 The use of water for a corrnnercial
fishing pond versus preservation of a stream for hiking, sport-fishing
and similar uses illustrate the two types of demands,

The doctrine of

riparian rights and prior appropriation have always recognized that
water be used for recreational activities was a reasonable or beneficial
145
use but rrost of the uses have involved general outdoor recreation.
Thus, the division should, at least, grant pennits for the diversion of water
for recreational activities such as swirrnning pools, golf courses, small
recreation lakes , and other cOllllilercial recreation activities.

[~

Impound-

rnents for recreational uses pursuant to KRS 151.210(2), discussed earlier,
should also be permitted.

Decisions to preserve water for unique natural

recreation activities are best made in the name of the general public and

[

will be discussed in the next section.
Many recreation activities are consistent with the concept of
multiple-use develoµnent, while others are not.

L
L
L
L
L

If the state wishes to

144To
"
.
. f old classi'f"icatory
ese c 1ass if"ications
are a daptations
o f t he sixscheme adopted by the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Corrnnission. See
Clawson and Knetsch, Outdoor Recreation Research: Some Concepts and Suggested
Areas of Study, 3 Natural Resources J. 250, 260 (1963) and Tarlock, Book
Review, 19 Stan. L. Rev. 895 (1967).
145 See Prather v. Hoberg, 24 Cal. 2d 549, 150 P.2d 405 (1944) and
Meyers v. Lafayette Golf Club, 197 Minn. 241, 266 N.W. 861 (1936) (golf
course may withdraw water from lake to irrigate its greens).
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implement a balanced recreation plan, it will be necessary to withdraw
certain streams from development in order that they may be preserved as
scenic rivers, fishing and canoeing streams.

This m:mograph will not

discuss the criteria which should be used to make such withdrawals or the
appropriate procedures which should be established within the state government structure to make these decisions.

This report will be concerned

only with the power of the division to refuse to issue a permit because
it conflicts with the state recreation plan or to issue a permit to an
appropriate state agency which would have the effecting of withdrawing
the water from further development.
This question has been considered by several western courts and state
agencies.

They have involved attempts by the proposed user to secure

affirmative protection for his use by giving it the status of a perfected
appropriation.

The courts and state agencies have all held that water

can hot be appropriated for preservation of fish and wildlife and scenic
beauty because an appropriation requires a diversion and no diversion has
been rnade. 146 These results have been criticized for carrying the diversion
requirement to a logical but non-functional extreme and these cases should
not be followed in Kentucky.

If the division finds that use of water for

preservation and fish and wildlife and scenic beauty is consistent with
state water and recreation planning, a permit should be issued to an
appropriate state agency guaranteeing their right to a mininrum flow.

146See Cascade Town and Water Co. v. Thrpire
.
land and Water Co. ,
181 Fed. 1011 (D.C. Colo. 1909) rrodified 205 Fed. 123 (8th Cir. 1913).
For an extended discussion of the problems of preservation of scenic
rivers see Tarlock, Preservation of Scenic Rivers, 55 Ky. L. J. 745,
756-57 (1967).
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r

Likewise the division should deny a permit to a private individual
or other public entity if they find that the proposed use would be
inconsistent with state water recreation plans,
in Section 170 to support such a denial,

There is ample language

The division has the power to

deny a permit if the proposed withdrawal will be detrimental to the
public interests,

Preservation of scenic beauty147 is now recognized as a

legitimate function of the state and thus the division's power to grant
or deny a permit for this purpose should be found valid by the Court
of Appeals.
A major source of public rights to make recreational uses of water
148
is the navigation power,
The power stems from the right of the Kings
of England to control the seas and inland waterways which were affected
by the ebb and fla-i of the tide to guarantee public rights such as fishing

L

and transit,

This restrictive definition of navigability was rejected

by the American courts because it was unsuited for a nation of non-tidal
inland waterways.

The Supreme Court based the power to control and develop

waterways for purposes of navigation on the commerce clause and held that
a stream was navigable if it was navigable in fact for purposes of commerce.
As government intervention in water resource development expanded from

I
l
L
L
L
L

navigation to flood control, water supply, and recreation development
the navigation power was used to sustain these new federal activities.
The navigation power was extended to the states after the American Revolution.
They assumed title to the beds beneath navigable waters and hence dominion
147 See, e.g., Moore v. Ward, 377 S.W.2d 881 ( Ky, 1964) which upheld
the control of billboards as a legitimate function of the state pursuant
to its police power,
148 ror an excellent analysis of the development of the navigation power
see Morreale, Federal Power in Western Waters: The Navigation Power and the
Rule of No Compensation, 3 Natural Resources J, 1 (1963).
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over them. 149 This development is beyond the scope of this monograph
and been briefly outlined earlier.

The significant point here is that

the navigation power is the source of public rights to swim, fish, boat,
and enjoy the scenic beauty of navigable bodies of water even if the bed
. private
.
and banks are held m
ownership. 150 ""'
sue publ"ic can not, of

course, trespass private property to gain access to navigable waters.
The navigation power involves two separate questions which have
often been confused by the courts.

The first involves the use of the

power as a basis for gove:mrrent intervention.

The second involves the

use.of the power as a basis for not compensating the property owner who
has suffered injury as a result of a project undertaken pursuant to the

navigation power.

The courts have generally held that the navigation

power imposes a servitude in favor of the federal government which makes it
impossible for a private individual to acquire a compensable interest in
navigable waters.

Thus, the courts have denied compensation for loss of

rights for a variety of injuries such as the destruction of an oyster

bed; 51

the raising of the level of the water up to the ordinary high water mark,

152

and the value of the site for power generation facilities. 153 Unfortunately,
the courts have never sharply distinguished between the use of the power

14941 U.S. (Pet.) 368 (1824)
150see Reis, Policy and Planning for Recreational Use of Inland
Waters, 40 Temple L.Q. 159 (1967) for a discussion of public rights to
the use of water for recreational purposes.
151Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82 (1913).
1521.Jnited States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R. 312 U.S. 592 (1941)
1531.Jnited States v. Chandler-L\Jnbar Power Co. 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
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to validate federal or state action and the use of the power to destroy
property without paying compensation.

There is a need to make this dis-

tinction by delineating the scope of the power and to determining what
kinds of property interests should be protected against destruction
without compensation.

The use of power to justify the development of water

resources for recreation underscores the need for the courts to grapple
with these two questions.

Fortunately, the Kentucky Court of Appeals

has never blindly invoked the navigation power as a basis for non-compensation
and the two leading cases show an awareness of the need to treat separately
the two questions outlined above.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has adopted a strict definition

of navigability consistent with the federal standard.

In Natcher v. ~

of Bowling Green154 the court held that a stream llfilSt be navigable in
fact for pllrj?Oses of comnerce and emphasized that "the mere capacity to
pass a boat of any size, however small, from one stream to another (is
not) sufficient to oonstitute a "navigable stream. 11155 Thus, public rights
will be confined to the state major streams and lakes under this standard
but this will guarantee that ample water is available to the public.
In Natcher the plaintiff's gravel bed was flooded, below the ordinary
high water mark, by the construction of a municipal dam.

The city argued

that because the dam was designed to improve the navigability of the stream,
they had no duty to compensate the injured riparian.

The court rejected

this argument after examining the purpose of the dam and concluded "a

L
L
L
L

154
155

264 Ky. 584, 95 S.W,2d 255 (1936).
95 S.W.2d at 259.
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purpose to create a pool navigable by small craft only cannot
be regarded as a purpose to improve navigation" and thus "there is a
clear case for the enforcement of the constitutional guarantee ccmpensation" •156 There is ample precedent for denying compensation but the
result is a good one.

It distinguishes between the use of the ~er to

validate the activity but not to deny compensation.

The real question

the court should ask is, what incidents of property ownership should
the owner be entitled to rely on receiving compensation if they are
destroyed pursuant to an exercise of the power?

Kentucky h3.s taken this

approach in a recent case arising from the improvement of the short of
Barkeley Lake. 157 Plaintiff owned a parcel with water access to the lake
and a small portion was taken by the state for a right of way.

This

severed access by water from the main tract to an inlet which led to
the lake but the state refused to allow c~ensation for the loss.

The

court reviewed the navigation cases and found cases denying and granting
c~nsation for loss of access and decided to take a fresh look at the
problem and allowed recovery.

The court found precedent in Natcher but

based its opinion principally on the effect denial of ccmpensation would
have on the state's recreational development.
"Let us keep in mind that the riparian rights of the land owned
by appellees were created by the U.S. Government in the construction

of Barkley Lake and the impounding of the water of the Ct.nnberland River

156Ibid.
157Department of Highways v. Thomas_ S.W.2d
(opinion not reported at time of writing).
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(1967)

I

r

above the dam.

It is simple logic that as soon as it became generally

known that Barkley Dam was to be constructed and the high-water mark
determined, appellee's property, like thousands of other acres of land
adjoining artificial lakes in the Commonwealth, enjoyed a fantastic
increase in value.

The value is there; it is recognized by the buyer,

the seller, and everyone else.
I

r

It occurs to this court that the question in this case has weighty

public policy considerations.

This Commonwealth has l!Dre miles of navi-

gable rivers than any other inland state in the Union (including the
tortuous Cumberland, which raises its head in John Fox, Jr., country,
the !IDUDtains of southeastern Kentucky, snakes its way south into the
state of Tennessee before becoming homesick for its native land and
str-eaking north to entirely embrace its l!Dther state before spending

[

itself in the beautiful Ohio.)

The construction of numerous multipurpose

dams has provided the fair state of Kentucky with l!Dre miles of lake

shore line than any other state, with the possible exception of Minnesota.
(Approximately 6,000 miles of shore line, containing 180,000 acres of
surface water, and

llD!'e

dams are being built.)

our State at an accelerated rate.

l
L
L

The population is increasing.

leisure

time is also increasing with automation, resulting in greater demand for
recreation.

All of this tends to increase the value of land with access

to our lakes.

This court will not blindly disregard such obvious facts

existing in this Comnonwealth in regard to value of land suitable for
camp sites fronting on public lakes with recreational facilities, and
.
l
.
. . .
,,158
practically al of them enJoy such facilities.

L

L
L

Industry is moving into

158Id. at
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Access rights are a good instance where compensation should be granted

r

when they are destroyed pursuant to an exercise of the navigation power
because.the littoral or riparian owner should be induced to develop his
property in reliance on the continued existence in order to encourage
state recreational development of water access.

Granting compensation

will rot unduly interfere with public improvements and should be an
expense which !IRlSt be added to the state's calculation of project costs.
Ccmpensation for other rights which may be asserted is not so clear and
the court !IRlSt pick and choose with care in defining compensable rights.
·
.
.
.
. 159
For example, m Wood:!..· South River Dramage District
a resort owner

I
r

suffered a severe loss of business when a drainage district lowered the
level of the water in the bay on which her resort was located.

The court

denied compensation because "The restriction appellant seeks to impose
upon the free exercise by the supervisors of the powers entrusted to them
for the public good might conceivably :impair and interfere with the effective
reclamation of lands in the district."

The court's attempt to balance pri-

vate against public interests is an unsatisfactory analysis and a better
rationale might have been that plaintiff's reliance on the district maintaining a minim.Jm lake level was unreasonable because its purpose was
drainage.

The same rationale vJOuld apply to compensation claims of property

owners on the sro:res of flood control and water supply reservoirs but
vJOuld be less persuasive if recreational use were the primary purpose
of the facility.

Hopefully the Court of Appeals will continue to decide

conflicts involving the navigation servitude on a case by case basis
examining such factors as justified reliance rather than invoking a blanket.
rule of no compensation.
159 422 S.W.2d 33 (Mo. 1967).
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If a watercourse is found non-navigable the exclusive right
to use the water for recreational pill'.1)0ses belongs to the shoreland

r

owners.

At conm::m law the littoral owners had a right to enjoin diver160
sions which reduced the level of the lake below its nonnal levei.

This application of the natural flow theory was rejected by some courts
·
·
which
held that conflicts
should be settled by the reasonable use rule. 161
This rule will not guarantee the littoral owners a minimum level although
the leading case applying the theory enjoined diversions which would reduce
the level below its normal height.

It is probable that Kentucky would

adopt the reasonable use standard but i f KRS 151. 210(2), discussed earlier,
is applied to fix minimum lake levels, littoral owners will be protected

r-

by public action rather than by common law doctrines because the recreational
function of a lake should certainly be a factor for the division to con-

[

r·

I

sider in fixing the minimum levels.
A related problem is the scope of the littoral owner's right to
use the surface of the lake.

Early courts adopted the theory that the

littoral owners rights were determined by ownership of the underlying soil.
The court thus divided the lake into an imaginary pie and confined each
l
.
162 A recent Florida case rejected this rule
.
1ittora owner to his wedge.

L

I
L
L
L
L

on the theory that it was impractical and impeded the recreational development of the state. 163 Kentucky should follow the Florida Supreme Court
for it makes little sense to attempt to confine users within imaginary

160Taylor v. Tampa Coal Co. 4-3 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 194-9L
161...
.
tiarrlS V, Brooks 225 Ark. 4-35, 283 S.W.2d 129 (1955),
162see ~ · , Sanders v. De Roe, 207 Ind. 90 191 N.E. 331 (1934-).
163Hill v. McLuffie, 196 So.2d 790 (Fla. 1967).
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boundaries,

The doctrine of reasonable use, of course, applies and

excessive uses by any one littoral owner which substantially interferes
with the enjoyment of others can be enjoined.

A good example of the

kinds of limitations a court could impose is illustrated by a recent
Washington decision, Botton v. State. 164

The state acquired the fee to

a strip of littoral property to provide access for fishermen but other
large public groups soon turned the small lake in a go-go resort area.
The private littoral owners sued arguing that such public use was
decreasing the value of their property and was beyond the scope of
the original purpose for acquiring the fee.

The court agreed and

held that the state's failure to restrict use to the original purpose
had become unreasonable in light of the small size of the lake and the
adverse effect the expanded use had on the value of other littoral
owner' s property.

This reasonable use l:imitation should apply equally

to excessive use by a private littoral owner.
Much of Kentucky's recreation potential may be lost if the state
fails to central the development of the portion of the shore held in
private ownership around the large multi-purpose reservoirs.

Unregulated

developnent will lead to a series of recreational slums attractive to no
one.

It is unrealistic to expect many units of local government to

assume their responsibility in this area.

A state program is needed and

one recently enacted by Wisconsin serves as a good rrodel.
164

165

The counties

420 P.2d 352 (Wash. 1966).

165
Toe Wisconsin Statute is outlined in Yanggen and Kusler,
Natural Resource Protection thruugh Shoreland Regulation: Wisconsin
XLIV land Economics 73 (1968).
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r

should be given a specified period of time to prepare sroreland
protection ordinances.

If the counties fail to act or fail to enact

"reasonable minim.un standards" the state srould have the power to adop,t
and enforce an ordinance. 166 Minimum lot sizes, sanitation requirements,
filling and grading, structural set backs, and Jil3.intenance of the
habitat would be some of the problems which must be dealt with by the
ordinances.

This program should be complemented by a program to acquire

scenic easements at crucial points along the srore to protect its environmental integrity.

[
[

[

L
L
L

L

166The state Jil3.Y delegate the zoning power to state agencies
rather than cities or counties if it chooses. Southeastern Displays,
lwc.v. Ward, 414 S.w.2d 573 (Ky. 1967).
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Chapter XI
CONCWSION
This report has focused on the laws relating to the allocation
of the state's water.

As conflicts become acute it will be necessary

fOI' the Division of Water to rrove fI'Om an info:rniation gathering and
planning agency to a regulatory institution,

As long as the Division

confines its functions to the first category of activities it is unlikely
that major pI'Oblems will be encountered in the operation of the statute.
If, however, it assumes regulatory functions serious problems could be
encountered for several reasons:
(,1)

The statute fails to clarify the relationship between the

com= law of riparian rights and the permit system.
( 2)

The statute gives incomplete protection to the pI'OCedural

rights of third parties and thus the statute is open to serious due
process objections.
(3)

The status of prior consumptive rights is not clarified

and serious constitutional problems are raised.
(4)

The statute contains unnecessarily broad exemptions such as

the one for agricultural uses which could cripple its effectiveness.
Nonetheless the statute is impcrtant because it should accustom
Kentucky water users to the operation of a statewide regulatory system.
It will allow the Department to collect the necessary data to formulate
long range plans which can serve as the basis for a well reasoned set of
- 106 -
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amendments when the necessity for them arises 1 such as a system of priorities
to operate during times of shortage.
There are other water problems which also merit serious attention.
There is a need to examine the rules governing liability for causing conditions which result in the flooding of adjacent land.

There is a need to

analyze public programs to prevent flooding,such as flood plain zoning
and the flood proofing of buildings.

The control of water pollution is

r
r

worthy of a separate study.

The state is also plagued by the proliferation

r:

the fornation and operation of the state's water distribution organizations.

L

is impossible to detennine if the establishment of a public administrative

of small water districts which are often underfinanced and thus must compete with cities for service areas on the unincorporated fringes of metropolitan areas.

This problem suggests the need to examine the laws governing

It is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of Chapter 151.

It

['

agency will work a substantial change in water use patterns or result in

[_

a follow-up to this study will be undertaken when sufficient experience

the rrore efficient use of the state's water resources.

It is hoped that

under Chapter 151 has been accumulated to permit a meaningful evaluation
of its effectiveness.

I
L.

L
L
L
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APPENDIX

Page 1 of 3 pages
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Department of Natural Resources
DIVISION OF WATER
Capitol Annex Building, Frankfort, Kentucky

40601

APPLICATION FOR WATER WITHDRAWAL PERMIT
(All information must be filled in to obtain permit - type or print)
Check one:
__Municipality
__Water District·-------------------------------'(~C~o~r~p~o~r~a~t~e=-·N:,,:.a~m~e~)
__Industrial Plant
__Private Water C o · - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Telephone No.
Address - Zip Code

C

Check one:
__Executive O f f i c e r ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Telephone No.
Address - Zip Code

r

Telephone No.
[

Address - Zip Code

List ::::o:e!:s!:r;o_n_t_a_c_t_e_d_,_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _(~N~a~m~e,e_~a~n,,_d~T~i~t~l~ecL.)

L

Telephone No.

Address - Zip Code

Name of Consulting E n g i n e e r - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -,. MARK U.S. Geological Survey 7\ Minute Topographical Map for your area showing location of the
[
following (if applicable): Location of Water Treatment Plant(s); Location of Wells you are
using; Location of Water Intake Facility(s); Boundaries of Distribution System; Location of
Effluent Discharge(s); Location and Capacity of any Water Impoundments. USGS 7\ Minute Topo[ . graphical Maps for your location can be obtained from the Kentucky Dept. of Commerce, New
Capitol Annex Bldg., Frankfort, Kentucky 40601. Map plus postage plus sales tax totals 46 cents
Rated Plant Capacity _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _GPD

Ave. Plant Output ~ - - - - - - - - - - G P D

Amount of Water Purchased _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __,,.,M~a~x~·_.sG~P-"'-D
[

If Purchased, from whom (.~E~xe.c.::.::.,'-"--"'~'-------------------------------WATER USAGE:
PRESENT

L
L
L
L

Average Daily Withdrawal _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ GPD

Max. Daily Withdrawal _ _ _GP!

No. Customers Billed ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - E s t i m a t e d Population S e r v e d - - - - - Type of Use:
Describe

lo Industrial
% Other
%
~-----------------------if used:

Domestic

Other,

Type of Treatment:
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,
r

Storage Facilities, Raw Water:
(Show number, type,
and capacity)~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

EFFLUENT:
Show GPD Returned to Each Effluent

Location:~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

r·
What is the Quality of Effluent at each

[

FUTURE REQUIREMENTS:

[~
['

[

Location~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-

PROJECTED TO YEAR

Average Withdrawal GPD
Maximum Summer Withdrawal GPD
Estimated No. Population to be served
Est. No. of Customers to be served
When will Reqmts. Exceed Availability
Do You Have a Plan to Provide Water Needed in the Future (,=E~x~p~l~a~i~n~)'--~~~~~~~~~~~~

List any.Water Districts who obtain all or part of their supply from your Water Treatment Plant

I
L
L
L
L

and show amounts furnished them in GPD.
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~

SOURCE OF WATER: If you have more than one source, show each source separately.
this page and attach additional sheets to this application if necessary)

(Reproduce

Ground Water:
Depth of We 11

~~~~~

Diameter ~~~~~ Date Drilled~~~~~-

r
OR
Surface Water:

Show Quantity Impounded (or Area and Average

I~

!~::hQ~::t~:~e:a:~t:~::::t!ns:::::~e GPO and Amounts you Request in your Permit, for each
WITHDRAWN

[
[

'

Depth)~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

REQUESTED

Jan.
Feb.
March
April

I

May

[

July

[

I
L
L
L
L

June

Sept.
Oct.
Nov.
Dec.
(NOTE:

If there is a significant variation between GPO you show as Withdrawn and
Requested, explain fully in your covering letter)

I do hereby certify that all of the foregoing statements are true and correct.

Date

Signature of Authorized Applicant

